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The impact of the American press on domestic support for low-intensity conflict operations: Angola and Nicaragua.

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THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN PRESS ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS: ANGOLA AND NICARAGUA

By

Dan Dragovich

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN PRESS
ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS:
ANGOLA AND NICARAGUA

by

DAN DRAGOVICH

This thesis provides a descriptive as well as an empirical analysis of the relationship between the press and the American government with respect to low-intensity conflict operations. Historically, the winning of "hearts and minds" (associated with the counterinsurgency doctrine of the post-WW II period), was an integral component of the instruments employed in low-intensity operations. Initially, winning of hearts and minds was applied to the target population environment. In reflecting on the Vietnam experience, the winning of hearts and minds of the American population seemed just as important, as by some accounts the press is viewed as a contributing factor to the failure of counterinsurgency policy in Vietnam, in that it led to the erosion of domestic support for the war. Therefore, an aspect to be considered in low-intensity operations is the necessity of maintaining the desired level of public support during the engagement. This, however, engenders a disturbing situation, in which the government attempts to control press-agenda setting, as well as to provide its own interpretation of news events.

This paper argues that, notwithstanding the necessity of certain restrictions on the press in combat zones for security reasons, government agenda-setting and control of the press are violations of democratic values which are doomed to failure in a free society. Although, the government may be able to set the agenda in a general way, it is nevertheless, unable to dictate a specific interpretation of news events. In addition, should the government succeed in its task, that success is a contradiction of the very goals the United States is seeking to establish.

This thesis further demonstrates that the crux of the problem in low-intensity operations does not lie in press reporting, but rather is related to the absence of clear political goals and the lack of a properly trained military and diplomatic cadre to be employed in such situations. Angola and Nicaragua were selected as case studies. Politically, the cases demonstrate contradictions between rhetoric and reality. Militarily, they demonstrate the same set of problems associated with counterinsurgency in the Vietnam era.

Chapter I discusses the importance of social conditioning and cultural values of the Western world which are consequential in perceptions of acceptable norms of conflict. Second, the discussion attempts to show that Western cultural values are most often inconsistent with the norms of low-intensity conflict operations. This dimension is especially crucial in the environment of a free press, where inconsistencies between rhetoric and reality are

reported on a daily basis. Chapter II examines the evolution of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) Doctrine and the reasons for the adversarial relationship between the press and government in such situations. Chapter III provides an overview of conditions and causes of conflict in Angola and Nicaragua. Chapter IV analyzes data generated by content analysis of American press coverage of Angola and Nicaragua at the height of low-intensity conflict operations. Chapter V offers a discussion of this data examining the inherent political and military contradictions, as well as some concluding remarks on the prospects of future undertakings of LIC operations.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my two families. To my paternal family and to my regimental family. To my parents from whom I have learned that life should not be taken for granted and to the Regiment from whose history I learned that freedom has to be earned. Both life and freedom require a degree of commitment and, at times, may have to be defended with a force of arms.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

DEDICATION.....vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....vii

CHAPTER I 1
Introduction

CHAPTER II 11
Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine
Military Tradition and LIC Doctrine
Domestic Constraints
CHAPTER III.....36
The Case Studies: Angola and Nicaragua

CHAPTER IV.....91
Methods and Findings

CHAPTER V.....117
Discussion and Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....133

VITA AUCTORIS.....144

CHAPTER I

1.1 Introduction

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) Doctrine developed in the 1980s as an unconventional instrument in American military strategy. It is an updated and broader version of earlier counterinsurgency doctrine. The overall aim of LIC Doctrine is to provide an alternative to conventional nuclear deterrence forces (which are considered inadequate and impractical for small scale military operations), in revolutionary or internal wars. These conflicts, common in the Third World, have been considered a threat to the United States interests since the end of World War II. Unconventional threats came to be perceived as more challenging to United States global interests than the conventional-nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact concentrated in Europe, even before that Pact's collapse.

LIC theory rests on two assumptions. First, conventional and nuclear forces will continue to serve as instruments of deterrence against any direct aggression on the part of Soviet Union or any other enemy. Hence, the likelihood of the United States fighting a high-intensity or large scale conventional war is remote. Second, widespread upheaval and unrest in the Third World will continue to threaten the interests of the United States. These situations were seem to have opened a new frontier of expansion for the Soviet Union, while at the same time minimizing the risks of direct

confrontation between the superpowers. In short, the entire spectrum of internal strife and political violence in the Third World was perceived as orchestrated by the Soviet Union and designed to undermine and erode American interests.[1] While some of these observations certainly require revision in the light of the ongoing political changes in the Soviet Union, one must be cautious not to over indulge in the prospects of development of "democracy" as understood in the West.

A number of advocates of LIC theory point out that in spite of recent experiences of less than satisfactory performance in unconventional operations, the United States continues to place an overwhelming emphasis on nuclear and conventional capabilities which are Europe centred and most unlikely scenarios for future conflict in the world. This traditional concentration appears inconsistent with the American foreign policy objectives.[2] To achieve foreign policy objectives in the Third World, it is argued that United States military capabilities must be able to respond, not on the basis of outdated perceptions derived from the so called "Vietnam syndrome", but to existing conditions. It is these conditions which must dictate the instruments of response, a

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[1] Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and Regional Comparisons, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988); Anderzej Korbanski and Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and the Third World: the Last Three Decades (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kurt M. Campbell, "Southern Africa and Soviet Foreign Policy," Adelphi Papers, (Winter 1987/8): 3-67.

[2] Donald B. Vought, "Preparing for the Wrong War," Military Review (May 1977): 16-35.

response which must often extend beyond the theatre of the insurgency.[3] Unlike conventional operations, where the destruction of military force is necessary for any form of political change, unconventional operations are a mixture of political, psychological, economic and military instruments which are employed simultaneously.[4]

The United States has had a long record of involvement in unconventional operations, certainly predating the Cold War and the process of decolonialization. This experience can be traced back to Indian wars, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and involvement in the Philippines and the Caribbean Basin at the turn of the century. Moreover, these operations were characterized by some degree of success.[5] Yet, by most accounts, United States performance in this area in more recent times is considered poor, if not in some cases disastrous. A variety of explanations have been cited, with good arguments and more than adequate research to support such arguments. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that

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[3] George K. Osborn and William Jr., "The Employment of Force: Political Constraints and Limitations," in Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Skully, U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1981): 49-68.

[4] Richard Gabriel, "No Light In The Tunnel: Can U.S. Unconventional Forces Meet the Future?" Conflict Quarterly, (1981): 4-8.

[5] Robin M. Williams, "Are Americans and Their Cultural Values Adaptable to the Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?" The Annals, (May 1962): 82-91. For further discussion on the origins of American experience in the unconventional warfare see Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); also Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986).

such failures are caused by several factors, rather than by a single fundamental political or military failure per se. Most experts argue for some type of reform of unconventional warfare theory and see nothing wrong conceptually with the doctrine.

For example, the counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s, while recognizing the importance of the political environment in unconventional operations, is considered to have failed on two accounts. First, the political dimension of the theory was never fully utilized in the conflict environment; second, the theory neglected the domestic environment of the intervening power.[6] There are examples of either "show of force" or outright use of force, such as Libya, Grenada and Panama, that could be classified as sucessful. Although these types of operations are within the scope of the so called LIC operations, there is, nevertheless, a distinction. While certain similarities may exist, the major difference is rooted in the nature of the oposition and operational methods of the oposition. Neither Grenada nor Panama entailed revolutionary or guerilla warfare aimed at the overthrow of the constitutional government. Grenada is an example of a coup d'etat, and Panama is an example of an unpopular dictator. Neither government had the grass roots popular support of the population that could

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[6] William V. O'Brian, "Special Operations in the 1980's: American Moral, Legal, Political and Cultural Constraints," in Frank Barnett, Hugh Tover and Richard Shultz, Special Operations In U.S. Strategy (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1984): 53-85. See also Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Strategy in the Third World Conflicts (New York: Crane Russak & Company, 1987).

have been exploited by the revolutionary cadre, even if there was one in existence.

LIC Doctrine specifically stresses the need for greater understanding of factors associated with unconventional warfare as they affect the American public.[7] Historical evidence (especially that surrounding the Vietnam war), suggests that information contained in press reporting contributed to a negative image of unconventional operations on the part of the American public. Overall, reporting is considered to have been superficial, at times wrong or biased, and at times lacking in in-depth understanding of the military issues.[8] This is seen as a reflection of journalistic attitudes and training. According to the Lichter-Rothman report:

> ...most of the [media] elite were in the upper socio-economic levels with the following characteristics: 95 percent were white, 79 percent were male, 68 percent were from north-east or north central states, 54 percent claimed that they were liberal, and 50 percent claimed no religion. The vast majority of those interviewed strongly supported the candidates of the Democratic party for president. In 1964, 94 percent supported Johnson against Goldwater; in 1968, 87 percent supported Humphrey against Nixon; in 1972, 81 percent supported McGovern against Nixon; and in 1976, 81 percent supported Carter against Ford.
> On foreign policy, there were also some particularly strong attitudes. For example, 56 percent felt that the U.S. exploits the Third World which causes poverty. In the response to the

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[7] David, J. Dean, Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1986), 27-29.

[8] Peter Braestrup, Big Story, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977). This two volume work examines the role of the jurnalists and television crews in the Vietnam war. Also see, Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Fiant: Triumph and Failure-America's Armed Forces (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 75

statement that the "West has helped the Third World," 75 percent disagreed.[9]

Additional comments on methods of reporting are summed up in the following way;

> There is an attitude common in the media that any good journalist can apply common sense and quickly fathom what is right and what is wrong in any complicated issue. Coupled with this attitude is one in which a reporter or a camera crew acts as though their presence, their action in covering a story, is more important than the event they are covering.[10]

Based on this and similar reports military planners concluded that in order to present a more realistic picture, alternate points of view and an alternative interpretation of news events was needed.[11] This approach would ensure a degree of public awareness of how the media operates (as a safeguard against reporters' perceived biased attitudes and lack of in-depth understanding of foreign environments). As well, a more realistic and sympathetic explanation of the conditions associated with unconventional operations would be presented.[12]

The general assumption underlying LIC theory reinforces the notion that unconventional operations are not only essential, but

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[9] Quoted in Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 265, from Robert Lichter and Stanly Rothman, "Media and Business Elites," Public Opinion (October-November 1981): 42-46. The research is based on "hour long interviews with some 240 journalists and broadcasters." Individuals were selected from; The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report. In addition they interviewed individuals from CBC, NBC, ABC, and PBS.

[10] Robert McNeil, "Why Do They Hate Us?" Columbia Magazine (June 1985): 17.

[11] Sam Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 226.

[12] Ibid,. 226.

could be carried out with the support of the American public. To achieve the necessary degree of public support, some advocates of the theory argue that a different pattern of reporting and an alternative interpretation of events was needed to serve as a vehicle of education for the public.

There is an obvious danger in this approach of turning an independent press into an instrument of government propaganda, such as found in totalitarian systems. Such would be an ironic outcome, since the principles of democracy are sought as the final objective of employing LIC doctrine.

The overall argument of this thesis suggests first that the whole foundation of unconventional operations is flawed; and secondly, given the nature of the American cultural and social values, it is beyond the government's ability to generate and sustain the desired degree of public support for such operations, at least under the present framework of LIC operations.

The existing literature suggests that LIC theory is flawed in three areas. First, it is taken for granted that all Third World states strive to develop along the lines inherent in the Western socio-political tradition. Second, military operations undertaken in the context of LIC theory are still unable to adapt to battlefield requirements which contradict the Western tradition of warfare. And third, the proposed solutions to deal with domestic constraints themselves oppose Western democratic values. Even with the additional understanding that the modern LIC battlefield does not have fixed front lines and does not acknowledge the distinction

between the combatants and civilians, it is unlikely that the human consequences stemming from this situation would be acceptable to the American public. The value of human life in the framework of Judeo-Christian heritage is too strong.

None of this denies that there are credible threats to United States' interests, or that the government should engage in unconventional operations. However, the utility of the present approach to LIC is questionable, as domestic constraints evident in the past are likely to be even stronger in the future. Reasons for this will be addressed in the following pages of the thesis. These so-called "domestic constraints" are also crucial in the framework of democratic governmental structure, as they serve as checks and balances against the government's ability to exercise a monopoly on the interpretation of news events. Even worse, restrictions on freedom of information can become a vehicle to hide government incompetence and blunders behind a veil of secrecy. After all, freedom of information is a very real element of the strength and appeal of democracy. If the overall aim of U.S. foreign policy is to export and promote democracy, it must retain credibility at home as well as in the developing world. Democratic principles must be safeguarded and maintained in the domestic environment, as well as applied and followed during episodes of low-intensity conflict.

Arguments suggesting that the media may have contributed to the failure of LIC operations appear to have some credibility. This approach, however, is treating the symptoms without curing the disease. As Colonel Summers points out, on average, "majority on-

the-scene reporting from Vietnam was factual, that is the reporters honestly reported what they had seen firsthand. Much of what they saw was horrible, for that is the true nature of war. It was this horror, not the reporting that so influenced the American people."[13] Other arguments go further, claiming that some segments of the media are ideologically too critical of American policy and interests and especially critical of U.S. involvement outside of well-established European defense system.[14]

On the other end of the spectrum, statistical evidence is interpreted to support the argument that media are already an instrument serving the special interests of the government.[15] It is further argued that contemporary media operating in a democratic setting are "serving the powerful and privileged as an agency of manipulation, indoctrination, and control".[16] This manipulation is apparently conducted in a subtle way, reflecting ideas and beliefs of the upper classes, as well as their interests.[17]

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[13] Colonel Summers, On Strategy, 68.

[14] William O'Brien, "Special Operations in the 1980's: American Moral, Legal, Political, and Cultural Constraints", in Barnett, Tover and Shultz, Special Operations in U.S. Strategy, 85, and Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 266.

[15] Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), xi.

[16] Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1989), 136.

[17] Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 86. and Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 4-28.

Notwithstanding the allegations against the media and the type of reporting characteristic of the Vietnam War, the origins of the American failure there were caused by the structural breakdown of counterinsurgency doctrine rather than by the type of reporting. Therefore, while the inevitable loss of American public support may have been accelerated by the media, it was probably inevitable. In this sense, Edward Luttwak's point that "public support cannot be demanded up front; it must be earned" is well taken. [18] Given the track record of counterinsurgency policy in South-East Asia, the American government fell far short of being able to rightfully claim unconstrained public support.[19]

The question that should be addressed is whether the government has learned from the Vietnam experience. LIC doctrine has been tested on several occasions in the 1980s, and these applications provide reasonable cases to examine the issue. This thesis focuses on the role of the press in the conflicts in Angola and Nicaragua in the mid 1980s. During this time, the Reagan Administration made strong attempts to reinforce a specific point of view, stressing the ideological dimensions of the conflicts. Therefore, it is of interest to analyze the content of the American press to determine to what degree the government was able to set

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[18] Edward Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters, (December 1983): 12.

[19] For further discussion on the failure of counterinsurgency see M. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988); Cable, Conflict of Myths; Sarkesian, The New Battlefield; and Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974).

the press agenda and, more significantly, to what extent a specific view point regarding these conflicts was reinforced in press interpretations.

CHAPTER II

Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine

Western Values and Origins of LIC Doctrine

LIC doctrine, much like counterinsurgency doctrine before it, is an offspring of the Cold War and revolutionary practice of the twentieth century. Modern revolutionary techniques have changed the nature of warfare by eliminating the distinction between combatants and non combatants basic to traditional Western warfare. The controversy surrounding World War II mass bombing strategy predates the war itself. The introduction of aircraft as means of delivering bombs led to legal and moral issues being raised in the 1920s, 1930s, during and following the war. In most cases bombing was justified on the grounds of being aimed at the military and industrial foundation of the enemy.[20] In addition, the potential for escalation of conflict between the superpowers to the brink of nuclear confrontation (where the costs would exceed any possible gains), contributed to confining conflict to the so called "low-intensity" level on the peripheries of great power national interests.

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[20] Sheldon M. Cohen, Arms and Judgement: Law, Morality and the Conduct of War in the Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 92-145.

According to one definition, LIC operations are defined as a "range of activities of politico-military struggle, where the opponent is forced to accept political-military conditions being imposed by the intervening power."[21] LIC operations still adhere to the Clausewitzian notion of war as being an extension of politics by other (violent) means, which implies that the polical-military action is aimed at imposing a specific set of political goals. An incremental difference may be found in the application of political instruments (along side the military force to achieve the desired goal), as the main tools of policy application. This appears to be the ideal expounded in the theory. In the best possible scenario, peaceful restructuring of social institutions by economic and diplomatic assistance is the desired option. LIC Doctrine resorts to military force, where and when the political components are unable to achieve the goals. The difference, however, appears to be in approach rather than a departure from the traditional objectives.

LIC operations encompass a wide range of activity: foreign internal defense or "counterinsurgency"; undermining of existing Communist or revolutionary states, i.e., "pro-insurgency"; peacetime contingency operations; terrorist counteraction; antidrug operations; and peacekeeping operations. The first two categories are of particular concern in the context of this research.

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[21] James Dean, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1986), 2-4.

According to the official interpretation of the U.S. State Department, counterinsurgency is viewed as a "technique for tiding weak and unstable governments over periods of internal upheaval until the constructive forces of political and economic development are strong enough to control the situation without external assistance."[22] Shafer argues convincingly that this is a relatively consistent trend in the American foreign policy, and, as such, should be understood in the historical context of the socio-political development of the United States.[23] Furthermore, this approach is consistent with human nature. People in general form perceptions according to their experiences and embrace ideas coinciding with their values and beliefs. According to Ruth Benedict:

> The life history of the individual is first and foremost an accommodation to the patterns and standards traditionally handed down in his community. By the time he can talk, he is the little creature of his culture, and by the time he is grown and able to take part in its activities, its habits are his habits, its beliefs his beliefs, its impossibilities his impossibilities.[24]

Consequently, it is understandable that policymakers and the decision-making elite, as well as the public in general, will view problems through their own narrow cultural prism. Based on the logic of historical stages of human progress and reinforced by the American experience, it became inevitable that political

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[22] Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 4.

[23] Ibid., 45.

[24] Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Mentor, 1960), 18.

development in the Third World would be seen to follow the same pattern. This also led to a dismissal of cultural differences and relevant experiences which may not have anything in common with the Western tradition. This version of development or modernization assumes that the economic sphere of human progress, represented by industrialization and urbanization, must be followed by the same pattern of political modernization.[25] There is a logical progression from primitive to modern. Recent experiences, however, indicate this assumption is flawed.

Initially, both Modernization Theory and Dependency Theory rejected the importance of culture and internal dynamics of the developing society, placing emphasis instead on the external forces of economics and politics. Since the 1960s, both schools have re-evaluated their respective positions and given increased attention to the cultural dimension of the developing states.[26]

Traditional cultural, ethnic and religious dimensions of developing Third World states have been neglected and down played with tremendous consequences. In Vietnam, this was evident to individual soldiers in the field, if not to policy makers. According to one soldier's account of his experience in Vietnam:

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[25] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1968), 5

[26] See for example, Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory in Transition (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1984); Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham G. Powell, Jr., System, Process and Policy: Comparative Politics 2nd ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978); and Richard A. Higgott, Political Development Theory (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

> When we got here, we landed on a different planet. In Germany nd Japan, I guess there was a thread of contact, but even when a Vietnamese guy speaks perfect English I don't know what the hell he's talking about.[27]

This is not an isolated situation or restricted to any given region of the Third World. It is also worth reflecting on Carlos Fuentes' poetic observations on Latin America;

> The three-thousand-mile border between Mexico and the United States is more than a border between Mexico and the United States: it is the border between the United States and all of Latin America, for Latin America begins at the Mexican border.
>
> It is the only frontier between the industrialized and the developing worlds.
>
> It is the frontier between two memories: a memory of triumph and a memory of loss, best expressed by Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz's famous exclamation: "Poor Mexico! So far from God and so near to the United States!"
>
> It is the frontier between two cultures: the Protestant, capitalist, Nordic culture, and the southern, Indo-Mediterranean, Catholic culture syncretism and the baroque.[28]

It cannot be denied that forces of modernization erode the traditional social, economic and political order. Evidence nevertheless suggests that cultural, ethnic and religious forces shape the new order in ways that are often distinctly different in character from the Western model of society. As well, these processes differ from state to state. This should not be surprising since Western democracy and the capitalist system, as well as Communism, rest on values based on the Judeo-Christian heritage. It is a fallacy to conclude that once traditional socio-economic boundaries are struck down by the modernization process the only

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[27]. Jonathan Schell, The Military Half (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 48.

[28] Carlos Fuentes, Latin America at War With the Past (Toronto: CBS Enterprises, 1985), 8.

choice rests with Communism or Western democracy. Most Westerners would argue that Japan is a democratic country. Closer investigation reveals, however, that Japanese democracy is much more community oriented, and individual freedoms are not as important in Japanese society as they are in Western society.

For example, Johan Galtung observes that the Japanese reject the Marxist assumption of a contradiction between capital and labour. Likewise they reject the economists' assumption, so prevalent in the Western societies, that there is a contradiction between labour-intensive and capital-intensive production. He points out further that where we say "either/or", the Japanese say "both/and". While this appears contradictory and paradoxical, to the Japanese it is perfectly logical and consistent with their cultural heritage rooted in the values and beliefs of Confucianism, Mahayana Buddhism and Shinto.[29] Even the rise of Japanese militarism in the twentieth century owes its roots to the Meiji Restoration and the Bushido Code rather than the Prussian model.[30]

Similar contradictions were encountered by the American forces in Vietnam and could not be understood and explained in Marxist terms alone. The Vietnam War was an entanglement of cultural differences; between Western values and Confucianism. In

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[29] Johan V. Galtung, "On the Rise of the Fourth World," in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., Global Peace and Security: Trends and Challenges (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 47-60.

[30] E. H. Norman, Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), and David Wurfel, ed., Meiji Japan's Centennial: Aspects of Political Thought and Action (Wichita: University of Kansas, 1971).

the Western tradition, Vietnamese people were expected to "reject the negative aspects of their traditions and nurture the positive ones."[31] This brings to focus the major attitudinal difference between the two cultures. In the Western tradition, alternatives are viewed as either "good or bad, with no shades of grey, the Vietnamese believe that extremes can be reconciled, or can coexist."[32]

Similar examples of contradictions are found in Central America and Africa. Costa Rica's external environment and experiences are almost identical to the experiences of her neighbours. The internal dynamics, however, are significantly different, which may account for a different pattern of development of political institutions. Adda Bozeman, in her study of conflict in Africa shows that African perspectives on war and peace are not mutually exclusive, as they are perceived to be by Western societies. This perspective is a cultural byproduct that cannot be altered in the same fashion as the geographical boundaries carved by the nineteenth century European states. In her concluding remarks she points out that "indigenous cultural traditions are

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[31] Nguyen Khac Vien, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam, (Berkeley: Indochina Resource Center, 1974).

[32] Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1985), 82.

resurgent everywhere, whereas European influences are in eclipse."[33]

The marriage between this ethnocentric approach in foreign policy and American nationalism has produced a strong ideological component in American foreign policy, evident even before the development of Communism as a competing force. Nationalism in itself can serve as a positive force for nation-building. On the opposite side of the coin, as Feinberg points out, for a great nation "[nationalism] has a darker, more dangerous side."[34] Whereas beliefs and values may serve to build a nation, ideology can become a tool to shape the world order. Although there is a critical link between the rise of Communism and militancy in American foreign policy, the basic causes of the American response rest in American cultural values and experiences.

American anti-revolutionary sentiment predates the rise of Communism. A long list of American interventions and counterinsurgency operations precede the modern revolutionary theories expounded by Marx, Lenin and Mao.[35] The road to Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua and Angola was charted at the turn of century; Communism simply became an additional reason to make the trip.

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[33] Adda B. Bozman, Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 369.

[34] Richard E. Feinberg quoted in Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 3.

[35] For an extensive account of the U.S. involvement in the Small Wars, see Benjamin R. Beede, Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars of the United States, 1898-1984 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1985).

Communism has often been given a greater degree of credibility by Western intellectuals and policy makers than by either people living under Communist rule or by rising elites of developing states. This too perhaps can be explained by the unshaken belief in the Western tradition. After all, Communism professed to hold an alternative key to progress from primitive to modern. The crux of the problem lies in the Western notion of good and evil, i.e., the inevitable confrontation between the forces of progress and the forces of decadence, or the forces of democracy and the forces of totalitarianism. American policy makers were blind to the internal problems of Communism. General assumptions were based on comparative analysis whereby Communist parties were perceived to possess legitimacy and support in their respective states comparable to support found in the Western democracies. Equally, socio-political institutions were perceived as supported by the majority of the population, reinforced by the strong bureaucracies and state monopoly on the use of coercive force.[36] Over time, virtually all revolutionary aspirations were perceived as Communist conspiracies. Lenin's dictum that "socialist forces and Capitalist forces are in the series of frightful collisions which is inevitable," was taken to be the law of nature. Therefore, the issue at hand was global confrontation, with superpower objectives in mind, and no grievance was seen to exist outside of this framework. The old grievances based on cultural, ethnic and religious divisions, which had served as a source of internal

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[36] Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 89-91.

unrest for centuries, simply disappeared from the vocabulary of policy makers or, if mentioned, were seen as factors being exploited by the external forces of Communism.[37]

Even today it is difficult to argue that the Soviet Union is a peaceful state, with friendly intentions. As with all great powers, "self-interest" is central to its foreign policy. Russian empire-building predates Communism. The new Soviet "internationalism" can be seen simply as a method of dealing with international constraints.[38]

The power of Communist ideology in general, and Soviet success in particular, have been over estimated. The internal problems of the Soviet Union, visible in the late 1980s and early 1990s, not to mention the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe are strong indicators of a lack of legitimacy and call into question the durability of political institutions. While the future of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is uncertain, there is now no doubt that legitimacy of every government within Eastern Europe rested on force of arms. If there was any legitimacy at all, it existed in the minds of the Western leaders and intellectuals. The opposition over the years manifested by defectors and dissident intellectuals

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[37] For varied roles played by landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation of agrarian societies, see Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). In addition see, Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

[38] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).

from the Eastern block was often dismissed by Western elites as reactionary and isolated. The events of the last few years, and especially the present chaotic political and economic conditions, are unlikely to create and develop the much hoped for democratic tranquillity. While the Western press is continuously focusing on the rethoric of democracy expounded by the emerging leaders, the new conditions increasingly appear to foster fascist tendencies and give rise to ethnic and religious conflict in much of the Eastern Europe.

Likewise it is increasingly evident that Angolan socialism is far from the Soviet interpretation of Marxist doctrine, a point which has also escaped the notice of the reporters.[39] An increasing number of Soviet client states in Africa are beset by domestic rivalry and political instability, which in the words of one observer, has led the Kremlin to support counterinsurgency rather than its traditional role of fomenting insurgency.[40] Given the present state of affairs, Soviet support can be discussed only in the past tense. The existing conditions of political unrest, economic decline and ethnic rivalry will no doubt continue to be resolved by way of conflict. If anything, the disintegration of larger states may intensify the frequency of small wars.

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[39] Colin Legum, "African Outlooks Toward the USSR", in David E. Albright, ed., Communism in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 7-35.

[40] Kurt M. Campbell, "Southern Africa and Soviet Foreign Policy," Adelphi Papers, 227, (Winter 1987/88): 51.

Similarly, the importance of Catholicism in Latin America, and the growing emphasis on religion in general, has often proven to be stronger than Marxism, and can create interesting and seemingly paradoxical mixtures, as was evident with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.[41]

Evidence of Soviet decline in the 1980s may have been the additional inspiration that triggered the "proinsurgency" element of LIC theory, intended to "rollback" and restore democracy rather than just "contain" Soviet influence in certain parts of the world.[42] The question is, how does one restore something that never existed, neither in most of the East European countries nor Superpower client states? This, may be one of the biggest paradoxes in American foreign policy. It may be well within the guidelines of humanitarian concern to support resistance movements in Afghanistan and Cambodia. It may also be in the U.S. interest to support the Contras and UNITA forces; but to claim that these forces are pro-American and democratic is more than suspect.

Even in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, American policy makers continue to view the world in the context of social

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[41] Daniel H. Levine, Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Donald Dorr, Option for the Poor (New York: Orbis Books, 1983); Deane William Ferm, Third World Liberation Theologies (New York: Orbis Books, 1986); Roger A, Johnson, and others, Critical Issues in Modern Religion (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

[42] Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, Low-Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon Books: 1988), 63; see also Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Low-Intensity Conflict: Support for Democratic Resistance Movements (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1988).

development as "good" or "bad", "either-or". Hence, the continuation of the structural fallacy in development theory, and LIC Doctrine as a technique of development, will continue to exist.

Military Tradition and LIC Doctrine

LIC doctrine is designed as a "politico-military" instrument. In simple translation, it is an instrument to deal with modern revolutionary situations where some significant segment of the population may be involved in revolt and the lines between soldiers and civilians are blurred. This two stage process, where political and military actions may take place simultaneously, is relatively new in the Western tradition of waging war. While the political dimension is deemed more important, soldiers are supposed to implement the policy, often without understanding the principles. It is argued that with economic assistance and peaceful political indoctrination, indigenous political elites could be assisted to overcome the stage of unrest inherent in modernization and preempt the externally induced threat posed by the pro-Communist forces. Implementation of the policy is dependent upon the support of a small segment of indigenous elite, often trained and educated in the West. This is a task most often entrusted to the Officer Corps and the Army. [43] Historically, in Western democracies the military

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[43] S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1962); see also Stephen J. Hoadley, Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975); and Augusto Varas, Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America (Boulder:

has been subordinated to the civilian government. To implement political change in the developing states, the military is often given unprecedented power as the only "progressive" force. While this may or may not be the case, granting the military such powers is a violation of principles of democracy.[44]

LIC theory further contends that among the population there will be a small number of agitators and revolutionaries who will have to be separated from the population by military force, if necessary. The crux of the problem rests on this ability to identify and separate the revolutionaries from the population. It is here that applications of military force run into problems. Separation of combatants from non-combatants is almost impossible to achieve, and, even if possible, exacts a high cost in time, material and human sacrifice.

American military doctrine derives from centuries of Western experience dating back to the Greek tradition of waging battle. Essentially, a well equipped force, dispatched to confront the enemy, decides the fate of the battle and the winner takes all.[45] The civilian population as a rule was removed from the battlefield

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Westview Press, 1989).

[44] On the development of patterns of civil-military relations in the Western tradition see, Samuel P. Huntington, Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[45] Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1989), in addition see, John Keegen, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking Press, 1976); and Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy:From Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).

and often spared. The political outcome was dependent upon the military battle. This has been a general trend in the Western tradition, with the exception of some religious wars. The whole idea of "rules of war" is founded on this tradition. [46]

The notion of restraint is a second key element in the conduct of war in the Western tradition. Even in infantry battles of classical Greece, a short violent battle would take place for a few hours and the winning side would spare the wounded and beaten enemy soldiers.[47] The invention of modern weapons and the mobilization of citizen armies sparked the desire to regulate modern conflict in order to impose a degree of restraint on the battlefield.[48]

Revolutionary and insurgency strategies reject the notion of restraint and separation of civilians and combatants. Every individual is deemed to be involved, either for or against the revolutionary cause. Revolutionary tactics resort to "hit-and-run" methods, ambush, sabotage, and above all reject the notion of being identified through wearing some form of identification markings, be it a uniform or some other badge of identity. Therefore, soldiers engaged in counterinsurgency operations are faced with a dilemma of

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[46] For further discussion on "just" and "unjust" wars, and "laws of war", see, Michael Walzar, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Arguments with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Sheldon M. Cohen, Arms and Judgement: Law, Morality, and Conduct of War in the Twentieth Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War be Just? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and Keith Suter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

[47] Hanson, The Western Way of War, 211-228.

[48] Cohen, Arms and Judgement, 3.

the unseen enemy, who strikes in a perceived "cowardly" way.

Even in the latter stages of revolutionary conflict the so-called "partisan warfare" stage, when the insurgency is strong enough to field uniformed elements of an army, the battle is still subject to "hit-and-run" techniques and an indirect approach. The revolutionary army is also dependent on the population for logistical support. The problem here is two fold. First, how does one cut off lines of logistical support, without causing casualties to the civilian population? Second, how does one employ a conventionally trained and equipped army against the opponent that disappears in the sea of population? It is not just a question of retraining small segments of the army in specialized units to gather intelligence and embark on "seek and destroy" missions. The response demands a restructuring of the theory of warfare shaped by the centuries of experience. It involves more than providing training in specialized skills; it reflects the mind set of soldiers, as well as policy makers.

Counter-insurgency experts often point out that Mao is perhaps among the most influential theoreticians on revolutionary tactics. He is often credited with formulating the theory of mass mobilization and outlining revolutionary tactical approaches. Most observers attribute this characteristic to his ideological background and totally neglect Sun Tzu's impact on Mao's military thinking. It is well documented that Mao rejected the Russian notion of a small nucleus of intellectual revolutionaries as a vanguard of the revolution. Mao believed that people, the masses of

peasants, would become the crucial factor in carrying out the revolution. It is also understood, according to Marx, that the society must undergo the process of capitalist development before it reaches the stage where it is ready for revolution. To Marx, "class consciousness" was an essential element. To Mao, "harmony" of people was a crucial factor. Harmony according to Sun Tzu is a by-product of moral influence of leaders. Mao's revolutionary theory should be understood in terms of Sun Tzu's teachings rather than in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory.[49] Where the Western tradition of warfare calls for frontal attack and decisive battle, the Chinese tradition stresses flanking, surprise, ambush and most significantly, to "strive to subdue the enemy without a fight" is considered as a superb skill of waging a war.[50] It is interesting to note that Sun Tzu's writings were neglected in the Western world until the latter part of the twentieth century. In recent times academics as well as military professionals and policy makers started coming to terms with the importance of cultural values and historical experiences as the foundation of military doctrine. For example, Larry Cable writes;

> Generally, doctrine is historically derived, in that it is the synthetic product of actual experience in previous conflicts. While doctrine can be altered with the advent of new weapons or new technologies of communication and transportation or according to the demands arising from a new conflict, the doctrine in effect prior to the start of a war

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[49] Sun Tzu, The Art of War translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 63-64.

[50] Ibid., 77.

powerfully conditions the military and civilian perceptions and decisions which lead to the onset of hostilities.[51]

The notion of "winning", which is measured in terms of taking real estate, decisive battles won and the number of casualties sustained in relation to these gains, is far removed from the realities of revolutionary warfare. As Sarkesian points out, in revolutionary war the focus must be on the winning of political-psychological spheres of concerns and not the battlefield.[52] The solution is still viewed in terms of employment of modern firepower, yet the objective of the small war is not material destruction, but rather economic and political development. [53] Hence, theory and application appear to be in disjunction. Structural limitations in retraining the U.S. Army are perhaps best summed up by a senior U.S. General at the height of the Vietnam War, when he said; " I'll be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war."[54]

LIC Doctrine of the 1980s reflects some of the lessons learned in Vietnam and elsewhere.[55] It acknowledges the existence of the

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[51] Cable, Conflict of Myths, 3.

[52] Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 83.

[53] Cable, Conflict of Myths, 163.

[54] Ward Just, Military Men (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979). 185.

[55] A.J. Eacevich, J.D. Hallums, R.H. White and T.F. Young, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case Of El Salvador (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). This short book is written by the Army officers and explores some of the differences in the

social dimensions and the internal dynamics of individual states, if not recognizing the fundamental importance of these differences. [56] Acknowledging the problems and implementing organizational changes to deal with them are not one and the same.

Domestic Constraints

Oscillation between "isolationist" and "interventionist" moods in American foreign policy is historically just as consistent as anti-Communist sentiment. This element of dichotomy can be traced back to the Founding Fathers. Where Jefferson cautioned restraint with respect to overseas involvement, Hamilton urged the nation to become a more active participant in the international community in order to serve American interests.[57]

On the question of revolution, great differences existed between the Founding Fathers as well. In the earlier stages of his life, Jefferson viewed revolutions as a necessary and an inherent right of people. Adams and Hamilton, on the other hand, rejected the right to revolt. According to Adams, revolution was only justified where "fair order and liberty and a free constitution could be rapidly realized and prolonged anarchy avoided."[58]

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application of U.S. assistance.

[56] U.S. Army Field Manual FC 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, 1981), Ch. 1.

[57] Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 21-24.

[58] Ibid., 94.

Jefferson's disappointment in the downfall of the French Revolution made him more sceptical about the utility of violence. Failure of subsequent revolutions to achieve their objectives, especially the elimination of human misery, and the constant reminder of excessive terror imposed in France, Latin America, Russia and China in the nineteenth century, only reinforced the anti-revolutionary sentiment of the United States. In contrast to their own revolutionary experience (which addressed political issues only), twentieth century revolutions in step with the French experience (staged to remove the poverty and human misery), were perceived as having unrealistic goals. The American Revolution rested on establishing political equality among peers. Social questions were perceived as the domain of individuals and their work ethic.

The rise of Communism, which advocated the complete destruction of the capitalist world order, demanded swift response. The United States response came in the form of "containment" policy and "development" theory. The Soviet Union had to be contained within its existing boundaries and its revolutionary tendencies would have to be extinguished. As an alternative, the United States would offer countries in the Third World a formula and the necessary ingredients for economic and political development.

Even though for most Americans, foreign policy objectives are removed from their daily lives, public opinion on foreign policy questions is deemed crucial as well as unpredictable. The application of military force in support of foreign policy objectives has to be justified in order to sustain necessary

support. In historical terms, especially in the twentieth century, public support has been subject to "great swings of mood."[59] One of the reasons for this inconsistency cited by Almond, is the apparent "failure on part of the American masses to understand the complexities of the foreign policy and their inability to influence outcomes." [60]

The overall level of public support on part of the American public against perceived Soviet threats in the pre-Vietnam era was relatively consistent. The inconsistencies inherent in the Vietnam War's military and political failures (incompetence and complete disjunction between the theory and practice of counterinsurgency doctrine, as well as lack of clear political goals), caused unprecedented discontent among the American public. The general trend of the Vietnam experience is by no means unique. This swing from enthusiasm to scepticism is prevalent in democracy. As mentioned earlier, American democratic tradition calls for swift decisive military solutions with limited casualties. For example, in Cotton's study of five wars since 1896, American public support consistently declined over time.[61] What is of interest is that the support for continued involvement in Korea eroded more quickly than in Vietnam, yet the opposition to the latter was more vocal. Three elements were introduced in Vietnam which were absent in

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[59] Gabariel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 226-244.

[60] ibid., 244.

[61] Timothy Cotton, "War and American Democracy," Conflict Resolution,(December 1986): 616-635.

Korea. First, elite opinion was actively divided and an opposition to the war was mobilized in Vietnam. Second, the Korean war was fought along classical lines, and thirdly, the news media were at the front lines in Vietnam, which came about as a consequence of developments in technology and communication. While some form of media reporting existed in previous conflicts, there was a degree of restraint and censorship, and above all, the absence of television cameras and instant reporting aimed at the public on daily basis.

The reality of the unexpected duration of Vietnam war and the alien set of rules associated with the experience (which were transmitted to American homes on a daily basis from the front lines), played havoc with American public opinion. This is still an unresolved element of LIC doctrine. While the government in general, and every president since Nixon in particular, understood the consequences of the electronic revolution, the impact of these additional constraints is currently being debated. In some circles, the mass media are perceived as an additional instrument of foreign policy. For example President Reagan stated that;

> The biggest advantage a modern president has is six o'clock news. Presidents can be on the news every night if they want to. They can easily make themselves the focus of every major news report, because the president of the United States is the most powerful individual in the world.[60]

Presidents' ability to set the agenda may contribute to raising and keeping an issue alive in the news. Agenda setting, however,

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[60] Charles W.Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 286.

will not guarantee the desired reinforcement of a specific point of view.[61] Adherence to moral principles and level of competence on part of the government is the deciding factor. Edward Luttwak's argues as follows regarding earning public support:

> ...it is an integral part of the duties of the armed forces to sustain public support by a purposeful and decently economical conduct of war operations. Luxuriant bureaucratic excess manifest in lavishly staffed headquarters and absurdly over-elaborate services and more important the futile misuse of firepower in huge quantities will, in due course, undermine public support for war even if very important national interests are at risk.[62]

He further elaborates on this point by drawing on the comparison of British and American experiences;

> Journalists who went to North Borneo to decry anachronism and suspect motives were instead captivated by the romance of elite troops at home in the jungle; after being briefed in rudimentary field headquarters manned by handful of officers content to sleep in native huts, after going up river in a motorized canoe with three quiet riflemen and Dayak tracker, even hostile journalists could only write well of them, of the British Army in general, and of the campaign. By contrast, journalists who went to Vietnam favourably disposed (there were few) could be antagonized by the experience. They were first confronted by hordes of visibly underemployed officers reduced to clerical duties in sprawling headquarters, then by scenes of gross tactical excess, the heavy-weight fighter bombers converging to bomb a few flimsy huts... [63]

The Iran-Contra affair, and similar incidents of covert operations and blatant bureaucratic disregard for the existing guidelines and

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[61] W.C. Soderlund, et al, "Constructing the Agenda: The President and Aid for the Nicaraguan Contras, January-April 1986" unpublished paper presented at the Fifth Annual Intercultural Communication Conference on Latin America and the Caribbean at University of Miami, February 1988: 7-9.

[62] Luttwak, Notes on Low Intensity Warfare, 12.

[63] Ibid., 12.

democratic principles simply serve to enhance public distrust and to divide elite opinion. [64]

To gain an acceptable level of public support, as well as elite support, for LIC operations the government must achieve congruence between the politico-military purpose and military strategy. According to Sarkesian: Military legitimacy rests primarily upon image, values, prestige and purpose; military posture rests on organization, training, technology, and leadership. [65] Persistence in viewing revolution in an ideological framework as competition between Communism and Democracy, will simply continue to erode public support at home as well as abroad. Organizations, their training and leadership can be altered with time. Societal values may not be as easily changed to conform to ideological positions. The justification of revolution or counterrevolution must be seen in what Hannah Arendt termed as the only legitimate cause, "the cause of freedom versus tyranny" with absence of ideological justification.[66]

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[64] For additional account of controversial topics of covert operations within the framework of LIC doctrine see, John Prados, President's Secret Wars (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1986); Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1988); and Saul Landau, The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and U.S. foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987).

[65] Sam C. Sarkesian, "Revolution and the Limits of Military Power" Social Science Quarterly, (March 1976): 674.

[66] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 11.

With all existing imperfections and biases, the press is one of the cornerstones of democracy. The existing code of ethics of the press, or at least some journalists, may be questionable. While reporters' personal biases and political attitudes may be more liberal than those of the majority of the public, these factors did not cause the failure of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, nor did they underlay the failure of the LIC operations in the 1980s.[67] The press simply exploited structural and bureaucratic failures, sometimes selfishly, but often within the guidelines of what they understood as their professional responsibility to the public.

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[67] Stanly Rothman, "Media and Business Elites," Public Opinion, 42-46.

CHAPTER III

The Case Studies: Angola and Nicaragua

Angola and Nicaragua have a significant number of similarities as well as some differences which are worth noting in a discussion of the internal strife and political instability which occured there. In the first place, geographical boundaries in Angola and Nicaragua are artificial products of colonial experience, albeit more significant in terms of consequent multi-ethnicity in Angola. Precolonial traditional communities of Southern Africa were culturally homogenous small kingdoms whose tentative boundaries were defined by kinship and ethnicity.[68] Precolonial Nicaragua, very much like the rest of Central American region, was a meeting ground for several Meso-Indian tribes which did not always live in tranquillity with one another.

In both cases, colonialism introduced new political institutions and established geographical boundaries to accommodate colonial needs. In Angola, colonialism was a more recent phenomenon and the newly defined boundaries crosscut ethnic and linguistic boundaries of traditional African kingdoms. In Nicaragua, the indigenous population virtually disappeared in the first century of colonial rule, rendering this issue insignificant. Unlike Angola, where the indigenous population retained a great

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[68] Adrian C. Edwards, The Ovimbundu Under Two Sovereignties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 1-20.

deal of African cultural diversification, Nicaragua, with the exception of the East coast, is a homogenous and culturally integrated society, in that practically all Nicaraguans are Catholic and speak Spanish.[69] Interestingly, both countries endured centuries of heavy Iberian colonial rule, which approached the task of colonialization with religious zeal aimed at conversion and assimilation. The Spanish succeeded by destroying not only the indigenous culture but the native population with it, while the Portuguese ultimately failed to achieve the desired degree of assimilation in Angola.

Perhaps due to heavy European influence and immigration, combined with the virtual destruction of indigenous culture, Nicaraguan nationalism, in step with rest of Latin America, came to life in the nineteenth century as a child of European enlightenment. Angolan nationalism, on the other hand, is an offspring of twentieth century European revolutionary heritage, involving the reawakenening of traditional roots, which were swept under the colonial blanket of Europeanization, but never completely destroyed. [70]

With respect to relative geographical size and existing populations, neither country is burdened with excessive population, a problem found in many developing countries. Abundance of agricultural land, favourable climate and natural resources appear

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[69] Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino 2nd ed.,(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 2.

[70] Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment: The Background and Prospects of Angolan Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962),5-20.

to provide more than adequate means for self-sufficiency and development. Yet, both countries continue to struggle with underdevelopment and political instability. Most common explanations for this are the lack of commitment to institutional infrastructure and the impact of the dependency syndrome.[71]

Great power intervention is not a new phenomenon in either Africa or Central America. The emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers simply changed the players but not the game. In the framework of the Cold War, the world was divided into so-called spheres of influence and buffer states to enhance a sense of security. Africa, however, had never been in the direct sphere of influence of either of the superpowers. Central America, on the other hand, had been in the American sphere of strategic and economic concerns for over a century.

Angola

Events leading to the Angolan civil war in 1975 and the subsequent ideological polarization of the ongoing conflict are multidimensional and complex. The origins and the continuation of the struggle can be traced to a combination of internal and

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[71] Arguments on causes of underdevelopment are usually split into two schools of thought, The Development Theory and The Dependency Theory. For further discussion see, Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Blomstom and Hettne, Development Theory in Transition: The Dependency Debate & Beyond-Third World Response (London: Zed Press, 1985).

external factors. First, the length and the intensity of anti-colonial warfare is a reflection of measures undertaken by one of the most brutal and oppressive colonial administrations to retain a retrograde and an unacceptable form of government in the Third World. The Portuguese government and colonial administration under Salazar's conservative and ultranationalistic policies constructed under the Estado Novo movement, continued to oppose all forms of self-government in colonial territories, even in the light of evidence pointing to the inevitability of change. Public opinion at home and abroad had no impact on the Salazar government, especially since Portugal was considered to be an important NATO ally, a situation which Salazar used successfully in preventing NATO members from being too critical of his policies. [72] NATO membership enabled Portugal to obtain the necessary military hardware to carry out a colonial war. Membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), reinforced Portugal's economic capacity to endure prolonged counterinsurgency operations in Angola.[73]

Even in the face of irreversible political changes gaining momentum in the colonial territories, the Portuguese believed in their national mission of fusing their colonies into a single nation. This fusion of distant and diverse inhabitants of the world

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[72] Alvin J. Cottrell and James Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Praeger 1964), 230.

[73] John Marcum, Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962-1976 Volume 2, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978), 22.

depended on the breakdown of traditional cultural barriers and the injection of Western cultural and spiritual values.[74] Even on the home front, Portugal marched into the twentieth century with an outdated and backward political system and consequently lagged considerably behind the rest of the West European community. In a sense, Portuguese foreign policy was congruent with its domestic policies, since the domestic population was also subjected to authoritarian government. While Salazar was able to stand firmly against mounting opposition in the international community, domestic political discontent and demand for drastic political change brought the authoritarian regime to an end. The end of Salazar ultimately concluded the Portuguese epoch of colonial influence in Angola and elsewhere, but not without a prolonged, bitter and costly struggle.

The culturally diverse Angolan society produced several distinct nationalist political movements, which competed against one another throughout the period of anti-colonial struggle, more so than against the Portuguese. Although this competition came to be viewed in ideological terms, especially by intervening powers, actual differences can be found in the cultural makeup of Angolan society. Cultural ignorance and arrogance, leading to a conclusion that Black Africa had no history prior to colonial period, is a dangerous assumption that contributed to legitimizing the

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[74] Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment: The Background and Prospects of Angolan Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 24-38.

ideological myth that the Cold War was the primary dividing issue in internal politics of Angola.[75]

The rise of Angolan political and revolutionary movements is best seen as an entanglement of old African traditions and modern European revolutionary heritage. The asymmetrical distribution of the power and resource base between the incumbent colonial government and the insurgency organizations was further enhanced by the particular intellectual makeup of individual leaders and competing regional and ethnic interests. Consequently, external support took on greater role than legitimate domestic support.[76] The intense and bloody outbursts of violence in the early part of 1961 indicate the strength and intensity of Angolan opposition to Portuguese rule. It is conceivable that under strong cohesive leadership, diverse Angolan interests could have been put aside for the common purpose of confronting the Portuguese. Ethnic, cultural and political barriers, however, proved to be stronger, even among the educated African elite.

Leadership plays an important part in any revolutionary movement for two reasons. First, clandestine political activism requires a highly centralized and hierarchical organization with strong leadership, especially when faced with oppressive

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[75] Ali A. Mazrui, ed., The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa (Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1977), on p.1, he quotes Hugh Trevor-Roper, a Professor of Modern History at Oxford as saying: "Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history... But at present there is none; there is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness... and darkness is not a subject of history."

[76] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, 10.

conditions. Second, in most traditional societies community leaders are viewed in terms of their personal attributes. This is most evident in rural Angola, where the traditional leadership is based on hereditary claims as well as on kinship. [77] The importance of traditional values is manifested in the inability of the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to consolidate its power in central and northern regions of Angola, long after its ascendence to power. Very often revolutionary leadership, with its intimate knowledge of its own culture and grievances, offers a set of goals designed to override traditional differences among the population, by way of emphasising joint action against the external enemy. In Angola, the revolutionary elite fell victim to its own deficiencies and narrow interpretations of nationalism, thus, it was unable to overcome historical barriers to form a common front. In addition to cultural, racial and ethnic cleavages, the Angolan revolutionary elite in their prolonged exile, became even more estranged from the Angolan population and dependent upon external legitimacy.[78]

From the early stages of insurgency in Angola the Portuguese government alleged a "Communist conspiracy", designed by a small number of Marxist intellectuals operating in concert with the Soviet Union, to undermine the Western position in Africa and weaken the NATO alliance in Europe. The American preoccupation with

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[77] For further discussion on the subject see; Adrian C Edwards, The Ovimbundu Under Two Sovereignties, and G.M. Childs, Umbundu Kinship and Character (Oxford: University of Oxford, 1949).

[78] John Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, 5.

strategic, issues encouraged its foreign policy in the name of realism to sacrifice what may have been morally right.[79] Ideological explanations alone fail to consider a wide array of internal factors predating the rise of Communism and the Cold War. Racial, ethnic, religious and class grievances were intensified and focused under the Portuguese rule. On the one hand, a strong, traditional cultural heritage continuously posed a threat to Portuguese rule, and, on the other hand, lack of cultural homogeneity provided the framework of internal strife which for centuries the Portuguese successfully exploited.[80]

Earlier sparks of opposition and occasional outbursts of violence provide some indication that the Portuguese policy of assimilation would have failed even in the absence of the decolonialization movement which swept across Africa in the twentieth century.[81] Portuguese rule was never secure outside of the Luanda region, and had to be reinforced and maintained by force of arms.[82] Nationalism for Angolans came to mean destruction of colonial rule, while the old cleavages predating colonialism impeded the vision of a new nation-state. In assessing the impact of and degree of importance attached to East-West, ideological

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[79] J. Isawa Elaigwu, "The Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan Civil War," in Mazrui, The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa, 215-235.

[80] Okuma, Angola in Ferment, 81-105.

[81] See, "The Bakongo Sources of Angolan Nationalism," and "The Ovimbundu, Chokwe, and Related Sources of Angolan Nationalism," in Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 1.

[82] Okuma, Angola in Ferment, 10.

polarization in Angola, it is necessary to examine the origins of Angolan nationalism as a source of anti-colonial sentiment, as well as the Angolan interpretation of the Western nation-state concept.

From the beginning of the Portuguese incursion in Africa economic determinants and a "white man's burden" ethic to civilize the natives drove colonial policy. These prevailed well into the twentieth century. For centuries, the Portuguese economy thrived on production of coffee and cotton and the fishing industry; all dependent on cheap labour. Vast mineral deposits and the discovery of oil fields made Angola that much more attractive, especially in the early part of the twentieth century when Portugal started experiencing economic recession due to a decline in demand for coffee and cotton.

In the shadow of a changing political climate the Portuguese clung to the theory of assimilation as a justification for the continuation of colonial rule. The 1950 census records the Angolan population at 4.1 million, of whom a little over 135,000 were considered to be civilized. This category was comprised of 79,000 whites, slightly over 26,000 mulattos and 30,000 African.[83] Almost 4 million of the population were labled as "natives" or "uncivilized", and excluded from the protection of Portuguese law. According to Edwards, "the natives are, unlike civilized, subject to the Labour Code. There is no Native Legal Code, nor does Portuguese law apply to natives. Administrative officers may apply Portuguese law, or native custom as known to them, or their own

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[83] Edwards, The Ovimbundu Under Two Sovereignties, 23.

judgement."[84] Five centuries of failure could not convince the Portuguese of the error of their ways. In 1951, in the face of looming international criticism, Portugal changed the legal status of its colonies from colonial possessions to overseas provinces.[85] The assimilated African, in theory, had the same rights as a European under the Portuguese law. In practice, however, this was not the case.[86]

From the early part of the fifteenth century when the first Portuguese ships arrived in the region, settlements and trading posts were restricted to coastal areas, with gradual inward penetration taking place over five centuries. [87] Signs of revolt and hostility on the part of Africans were evident from the early stages of contact in the latter part of 1400s, rendering inward progress slow and costly.[88] Initital resistance, however, was local, disorganized and ethnically based.[89] The Portuguese colonial administration encountered five major ethno-linguistic communities in the region which became known as Angola: Bakongo in the North, Chokwe in the Northeast, Ovimbundu and Ganguela in

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[84] Ibid., 23.

[85] Okuma, Angola in Ferment, 33.

[86] Ibid., 26.

[87] John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, 1950-1961 Volume 1, (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 13.

[88] Okuma, Angola in Ferment, 10.

[89] See, Ali Mazrui, "Armed Kinsmen and the Origins of the State," in Mazrui, The Warrior Tradition, 1-19.

Central Angola, Chaneka-Humbe and Ambo in the South and Ganguela in the Southeast.[90] Throughout the Portuguese colonial presence, Luanda was maintained as the administrative and commercial centre of the colony. The heavy European influence here contributed to a relatively strong degree of assimilation and Western intellectual influence. The Portuguese impact found in Luanda never reached the same level of influence in any other region of the colony. In reality, most of the colony was never brought under close administrative control.[91] The Luanda-Mabundu exterior region avoided the direct imprint of colonial rule until the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when a railroad connecting Luanda with several major centres in the Mabundu region enhanced colonial control.[92] Modern transportation and communication lines, which may have been perceived as tools of pacification, contributed to colonial downfall in the long run. By the turn of the century, nationalistic fever, accompanied by winds of change in international politics, planted the seeds of colonial destruction. Technological progress in transportation and communication simply accelerated the dissemination of political dissent and ensured wider participation. Marcum remarks that, "railroad linkage created communication access that later

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[90] Ibid., 12.

[91] Ibid., 9-18.

[92] Ibid., 15.

served to spread modern political ideas and movements inland from Luanda".[93]

Ensuing nationalism and organized resistance, with overtones of Western notions of self-determination, were nevertheless, heavily influenced by the societal values and traditional political institutions predating European conquest.[94] Unlike the rural areas, Luanda and several other urban centres in the region, were characterized by heavy European influence and the rise of a mulatto class and experienced a nearly complete breakdown of traditional cultural values. According to one source, the slave trade gave rise to three distinct communities in Luanda alone, where the division of labour was based on racial origin: "A powerful slave-owning and slave-trading white class, a detribalized class of Negroes who cooperated in this trade with the Portuguese, and a Mulatto and Mestizo class, some of whom attained important positions in the militia, in the slave-trade, and in the Church."[95] Even well into the twentieth century small numbers of the white population dominated the colonial government, the military and trade. By 1913, the total white population in Angola reached 12,000.[96] Portuguese immigration, however, mushroomed in

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[93] Ibid., 15.

[94] Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 20-40.

[95] C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 36.

[96] Ibid., 17.

the early part of the twentieth century, resulting in a figure in excess of 200,000 Portuguese by mid 1960s.[97] Historically, the Portuguese presence was restricted to males. As late as 1900, there were only about 100 white women living in Luanda.[98] Consequently, the Portuguese formed fleeting unions with African women, which, while in the early stages may have been due to the lack of white women, in more recent times was encouraged as a conscious aim of the Portuguese policy to enlarge the mulatto population and de-Africanise and assimilate large segments of the society.[99] This arrangement produced a large, leading group in urban centres which continued to outnumber the white population by three or four to one, well into the twentieth century.[100]

Generally, the mulatto population formed an integral component in a hierarchical class structure. Yet, the mulattos continued to occupy subservient positions, even though in most cases they were better educated than the new groups of European emigrants. Social status depended on whether a person was considered to be assimilated into the Portuguese culture. Assimilation, however, was considered a privilege and not an inherent right. One was not born into the category, but rather bought his/her way into this club of civilized and Europeanized members of Portuguese colonial society.

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[97] Ibid., 17.

[98] Ibid., 18.

[99] Ibid., 18.

[100] Douglas L. Wheeler, Portuguese Expansion in Angola Since 1836: A Re-examination (Salsibury: Central African Association, 1967), 13.

In order to gain entry into this privileged class, one had to be of good character, speak Portuguese, be educated, possess financial security and agree to undertake military service.[101] Needless to say, very few Africans a mulattos could meet the necessary requirements, even when they were interested in becoming Europeanized.

Consistent with their traditional beliefs, Africans for centuries expressed their grievances in terms of armed rebellions.[102] Mulattos relying on acquired education and first hand knowledge of European customs, utilized new tools of political activism to express frustrations and resentment.[103] In the initial phase of political activism, Angolan intellectuals were convinced that independence and self-government could be obtained by political reforms, negotiations with the colonial administration and the external support of Western, liberal minded governments.[104] Unlike the British in South Africa, India, and elsewhere, the Salazar government responded with repressive

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[101] Akuma, Angola in Ferment, 23.

[102] Bozeman, Conflict in Africa, 181; and Mazrui, "The Warrior Tradition and the Masculinity of War," in Mazrui, The Warrior Tradition, 70-81. For earlier patterns of political and popular protest, see, Douglas Wheeler, "A Nineteenth Century African Protest in Angola: The Radical Journalism of Jose de Fontes Pereira (1823-1891)," in Ali Mazrui and Robert Rotberg, The Traditions of Black Protest in Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[103] Mazrui, "Gandhi, Marx and the Warier Tradition," in Mazrui, The Warrior Tradition, 179-196.

[104] Mazrui, "Gandhi, Marx and the Warrior Tradition," in The Warrior Tradition, 179-197.

measures to extinguish all hope of a peaceful solution. Allegations were made of a "Communist conspiracy," attributed to a small number of intellectuals operating in concert with the Soviet Union to undermine Western influence in Africa and plant seeds of doubt in the NATO alliance. Portuguese allegations of Marxist influence had some merit since some of the political activism in the Luanda area can be traced to the Communist Party of Angola. Communist conspiracy theory, however, fails to explain widespread revolt in rural Angola. On the surface, political grievances in Luanda fall within the framework of class struggle; their origins, however, go deeper into the crisis of racial identity, which Marcum points out is African by birth, European by education, or a new elite whose values do not conform to either tradition? [105]

This is perhaps where Marxism, with its emphasis on class rather than racial conflic, as a source of inequality and exploitation appealed to this group of young intellectuals. In response to Portuguese oppressive measures, and in step with Marxist doctrine, young Angolan intellectuals in Luanda decided in 1955 to form the Angolan Communist Party (PCA).[106] Marxism, however, requires a further and complete breakdown of traditional society, which was far from acceptable to rest of the population. In December 1956, leaders of the Communist Party went on to form a nationalist front party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), as an umbrella organization to accommodate diverse

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[105] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 1, 16-30.

[106] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 1, 27.

political platforms of other nationalist movements .[107] Whereas this policy found common ground with smaller political movements in Luanda, it failed to convince rural Angolans of northern Bakongo and central Ovimbundu regions, who shared little with the Europeanized intellectual elite.

Dr. Agostinho Neto and Mario Coelho Pinto de Andrade were among the most influential and also, typical examples of Marxist leaders. Neto, a Mebundu and the son of a Methodist pastor, was educated in Luanda and Portugal, where he came in contact with European Marxists at an early age. de Andrade, a mulatto born in Dembos region on the outskirts of Luanda and also educated in Luanda and Portugal, came in contact with European Marxists at an early age as well. Their early political activism and strategy of pacifist protest was short lived, as Portuguese secret police infiltrated MPLA ranks relatively early in Luanda and arrested, imprisoned and exiled local leaders, including Neto. Following this episode MPLA leadership continued to direct the movement from Europe and later on from the Congo.[108] Exile created a new set of psychological factors for the leadership, which impaired their capacity to gain internal legitimacy and coordinate timely political and revolutionary action from inside.[109]

The second source of nationalism and resistance to Portuguese colonial rule came from the northern, Bakongo region. The

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[107] Ibid., 28.

[108] Ibid., 35-38.

[109] Marcum. Angolan Revolution, Volume 2. 5.

anti-colonial flavour uprising among the rural, peasant population owes its roots to religious and ethnic origins rather than to European political ideas. The region comprises some fifteen ethnic subgroups, of which the Bakongo and Bazombos are by far the largest and most influential. On the other hand, Bazombos, were historically traders, entrepreneurs and white-colour workers, under the heavy influence of Protestant religion, and adopted a strategy of wide spread African revolt through religious protest.[110] Both, Catholic and Protestant missionaries were active in the region since the early nineteenth century. Growth of the Protestant faith took place rapidly during the early late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1950, some 13 percent of the Angolan population was recorded as Protestant, while 35 percent of the Bakango population alone was listed as Protestant. For Portuguese authorities, who came from a country where Protestantism was equated with rebellious individualism, this warranted drastic actions to restrict religious activities. [111] As Marcum points out, "a natural result of this restrictive religious policy was the tendency for Africans to empathize and identify with British and American missionaries, who were also fighting local officialdom, and to look upon them as potential liberators."[112] The Catholic church, on the other hand, was considered an extension of the government hierarchy, and was increasingly rejected by the

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[110] Ibid., 50.

[111] Len Addicot, Cry Angola (London:SCM Press, 1962), 15.

[112] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 1, 55.

Africans. The anti-Protestant campaign dealt a tremendous blow to Baptist and Methodist congregations. By 1962, out of sixty-five ordained ministers, thirteen were in prison, five were dead, eleven were missing, and thirty-six were refugees.[113]

Two distinct trends account for some earlier disagreements and opposing tendencies in the Bakongo region. In step with traditional ethnic and linguistic lines, in May 1956 a small nucleus of exiled and emigrant Bakongo leaders established a formal organization of Union of Northern Population of Angola (UPNA).[114] UPNA grievances and goals, articulated from Leopoldville, were based on the claim that, their territory had never been conquered by the Portuguese, and therefore they should be granted right to self-determination, or at least the degree of autonomy previously enjoyed by Bakongo kings. The Bakango region belonged to the Kongo kingdom, which functioned under indirect Portuguese rule until 1957 when king, Dom Antonio III suddenly died, and the Portuguese purposely left the throne unoccupied. A small group of reform-minded exiles in Leopoldville had no desire to form a new kingdom. The UPNA's political platform called for the formation of a modern nation-state in the northern sector of Angola, where the Bakongo population spoke Kikongo, while the southern, colonized sector which spoke Kimbundu was to remain under Portuguese rule.[115] In

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[113] Okuma, Angola in Ferment, 89.

[114] Marcum. Angolan Revolution, Volume 1, 62-63.

[115] Ibid., 62. This claim is apparently based on the document signed by an illiterate king Dom Pedro V, who was tricked by Father Antonio Barroso into signing a document which he did not

1958, Haldane Roberto, who was emerging as a leading figure in the movement, arrived in Lagos to represent the UPNA at the All-African Peoples Conference, only to be advised that UPNA's position was considered to be a "tribal anachronism", and, as such, inconsistent with modern concepts of a nation-state. Under pressure from leading African leaders, UPNA became known as the Union of Angolan Population (UPA), emphasising political action for the purpose of establishing a democratic regime for all peoples of Angola without discrimination as to age, sex, ethnic origin or domicile.[116]

Roberto was a product of rural northern Angola. His African education, strong ties to Protestant religion and commitment to African tradition provide some insight into the motivations and limitations of the movement he led. Roberto was born in Sao Salvador into a Bakongo Baptist family, and at the age of three moved with his family to Leopoldville, where he was educated at the BMS mission. Roberto was to return to Sao Salvador in 1949 for the first time since he left as a child. Unlike the Luandan intellectuals, who were influenced by European Marxists, African tradition and African leaders were by far the most important factors in forming his intellectual and political views. Patrice Lumumba, Frantz Fanon, Ben Bella and Kwame Nkrumah perhaps rate

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understand. Therefore, this transfer of sovereignty was deemed illegal.

[116] Ibid., 67.

among the most influential.[117] Nevertheless, as an exile, and out of touch with domestic Bakongo population, he too came to depend on external support rather than domestic legitimacy.[118] Ironically, his consistent tendencies to control and run UPNA (and later on the FNLA) with an iron fist, have much more in common with earlier Bakongo kings than with modern, Western concepts of democracy.

Although Protestantism was influential in northern Angola, its greatest stronghold was in the Bazumbo region. As indicated earlier, Bazumbos were traders and enterprenuers who travelled widely throughout the region, while Bakongos were more attached to their land and the traditional Kongo kingdom. Consequently, the source of political activism in the Bazumbo region can be traced back to a mixture of Protestant ethic and earlier African religious traditions rather than to indigenous political institutions. According to one source, the religious Tocoist movement, which later became the politically oriented Assomizo movement, had borrowed from "the Baptists, Kimbanguists, Watch Tower and the dark depths of heathenism."[119] The movement's political significance is perhaps best summarized by Marcum as follows:

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[117] For further discussion on Roberto see Marcum, "The Bakongo Source of nationalism," in Angolan Revolution, Volume 1, and "the Pattern and Problems of Two-Party Insurgency, in Angolan Revolution, Volume 2.

[118] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 1. 65-68.

[119] Ibid., 80. Rev. Grenfell quoted by Artur Maciel in Angola Heroica (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand, 1963).

> Like the Baptists, but in the departure from traditional Bazombo custom, it upheld monogamy and a prominent role for women in church councils. Like the Kimbanguists, it attributed to its prophet messianic power, including the power to forgive sins. Members prayed to the Father, Simao Toco, and the Holy Spirit. Like the Watch Tower movement, it prophesied that Christ would return to earth, but this time to liberate black men.... The rebellion of Tocoism was thus limited to religious matters, broadly interpreted... There were nevertheless latent elements of racial and political protest, which account in the final analysis for the movement's broader historical significance. By creating and perpetuating an entirely African organization from which Europeans were excluded, Tocoistas demonstrated the possibilities for developing disciplined black power. And by embracing certain practices, and prophesies, they revealed evidence of a deep and probably widespread African distrust of white motives, Portuguese, Catholic, or British Baptist.[120]

An organizational merger was proposed on several occasions by the leaders of UPA and Assomizos. From the beginning, Roberto insisted on the UPA's terms whereby each of Assomizo's members would be considered on their individual merit and their acceptance of UPA's political agenda. While most of the leaders accepted the UPA's terms, some refused and continued to run an independent political movement. The Bazumbo religious movement at first adopted a peaceful approach to political protest, which was maintained even at a later date when it was transformed into the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA).[121] By mid 1961, PDA became convinced that pacifist means were inadequate to deal with Portuguese counterinsurgency measures, and entered into negotiations with both the MPLA and UPA. In the end, in part due to regional and linguistic similarities with the UPA and lack of common ground with

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[120]. Ibid. p. 81.

[121] Ibid., 235.

MPLA's urban and intellectual orientation, the PDA merged with UPA in April 1962, forming a new political movement, the National Front for Liberation of Angola, (FNLA).[122] According to sources cited in Marcum's book, Jonas Savimbi's membership in the UPA, with his Ovimbundu background and support, provided PDA with the necessary assurance of promoting a wider, north-south alliance between Angolan nationalists.[123]

The third source of nationalism and resistance to Portuguese rule originated in the central and southern highlands of Angola among the Ovimbundu and Chokwe inhabitants of the region. The Ovimbundu constitute, by far, the largest ethnic group in Angola, and are potentially the strongest source of nationalism. In the absence of outside contacts enjoyed by the Luanda mulatto elite and the northern Bakongo elite, and reinforced by internal strife between smaller kingdoms, the Ovimbundus lacked coherence in their political activism, and often, as in the case of Savimbi, joined one of the existing movements.

The early quest for slaves, minerals and a favourable climate on the highlands attracted Portuguese farmers and traders in the eighteenth and nineteenth century into the isolated Ovimbundu territory. With these settlers came priests and missionaries, who provided education for the small assimilated black elite. In time to come, this small segment of the educated elite provided a first generation of political activists in the region. Similar to the

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[122] Ibid., 245.

[123] Ibid., 243-248.

Bakango experience, the entrenched regional, ethnic and now religious (Catholic and Protestant), differences reinforced the existing cleavages, which continued to undermine nationalistic unity. Consequently, several fragmented movements came into existence, the Young Christians of Angola (JCA), Cultural Organization of Angola (OCA), and Natural Union of Angola (UNATA), being the most prominent of the groups. Some survived and amalgamated with other movements, while others were stamped out by the Portuguese.[124] Faced with oppressive Portuguese measures, religious movements were forced to operate in the form of secret societies. Increasing awareness of actions in the Belgian Congo and in northern parts of Angola eventually linked these smaller movements with the UPNA organization in the north. The full force of resistance remained fragmented until 1964, when Jonas Savimbi left the ranks of FNLA and formed his own political party, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In some respects, Savimbi shared a degree of common ground with Roberto, yet, there were significant differences that would eventually cause the two to part company.

Savimbi was born into a prominent Protestant Ovimbundu family in the Moxico district. Unlike Roberto, who was brought up and educated in Leopoldville, Savimbi grew up and received education in a local Protestant school, Dondi Mission and Silva Petro secondary

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[124] Ibid., 105-108.

school in Chilesso.[125] In 1958, at the age of 24, Savimbi was sent to Portugal to pursue further education. Two years later he moved to Switzerland and switched from premedical to political science studies. In 1961, acting on advice of Tom Mboya of Kenya, he accepted the position of a secretary-general of UPA and returned to Africa.[126] Due to Roberto's autocratic rule of FNLA movement, and charges that the FNLA was an imperialistic tool of the West, Savimbi decided to form an Ovimbundu based movement.

The first phase of Angolan violence in early 1961 appears to have been a spontaneous and uncoordinated action, not unlike some of the earlier revolts. The outbreak of rioting took place in the coffee growing north, cotton growing central region and fishing industry areas in the south, following the decline in demand for their products. Economic decline and resulting unemployment also triggered rioting in Luanda. The existence of political movements and the presence of an active African intellectual elite marked significant differences from earlier uprisings. When the Portuguese authorities responded with brutal force to quash the uprisings at a tremendous cost of human life, it only triggered a second round of violence, which appears to have been organized by several movements.[127] This round of revolt led to a protracted state of

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[125] Ibid., 224.

[126] Ibid., 245.

[127] Ibid., 125. According to UPA records over 7000 Africans were killed in this uprising.

rebellion in March of 1961 following the U.N. Security Council's discussion on Angola, which attracted world attention.[128]

The Portuguese refusal to concede to any form of negotiated settlement, combined with sweeping revolutionary changes in other African states, convinced the leaders of the respective movements that armed insurrection was the only alternative. Political and ethnic cleavages, as well as idiosyncratic differences, proved to be too wide a gap to be bridged between the political movements, even at this stage of insurgency. Competing interests, and struggle for external support and legitimacy, contributed to further division between FNLA and UNITA, thus creating a three party insurgency throughout remainder of the anti-colonial and civil war.

During the anti-colonial war, diverse political and ideological preferences of individual leaders played into the hands of the Portuguese and South African propaganda campaign. At the outbreak of civil war, these same factors tended to promote South African, American, Chinese and Soviet intervention. Irreconcilable factional differences made it inevitable that there would be a final showdown between the three movements. The overpowering shadow of superpower interests outgunned and outmaneuvered domestic, Angolan issues of independence and self-determination. Competing revolutionary movements with distinct political agendas with an emphasis on external support opened the door to superpower politics, thereby incorporating Angola in the ideological battlefield of the Cold War.

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[128] Ibid., 130.

In ideological terms, external support is designed to encourage and assist the post-colonial developing state to conform to the political and institutional pattern of the sponsor. The Angolar experience is an example of a revolutionary labyrinth of domestic factors, interlocked with superpower interests, where domestic interests of political development and economic progress are not in tune with superpower agendas.

Ideological and strategic interests of the superpowers had not changed drastically from the early phase of the Angolan civil war.[129] The players, (or more accurately the pawns) in the game have on occasion switched sides. Thus, the question of credibility comes to mind as one of the problems for the superpowers, especially for the United States. As a democracy, where domestic support is an important consideration, it becomes difficult to explain the reasons for a sudden change in ideological orientation of one of its beneficiaries. From the early part of the anti-colonial struggle to the present time, at some point, all three movements have undergone some degree of this chameleon-like ideological transformation. Needless to say this in itself is bound to create public doubt regarding the viability of supporting movements whose political and ideological orientations are unreliable.

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[129] Kurt Campbell provides short and clear outline on Soviet objectives in Angola. See, "Southern Africa and Soviet Foreign Policy," Adelphi Papers, (Winter,1987/88); 3-67. On the U.S. interests in Angolan conflict see, Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward African States Since 1960 (New York: Quil, 1984).

In the earlier stages of the anti-colonial struggle both the MPLA and FNLA lobbied for assistance. Moral and material assistance to both movements, at one point in time or another, came from the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Western Europe. Equally, both movements were perceived as Communist inspired during the early part of the struggle. Portuguese and South African propaganda campaigns convinced some elements in the United States that Roberto was a Communist.[130] Later on it became clear that Roberto was far from being a Communist (even though he received some assistance from East Europeans and the Chinese), as evidence suggests he was on a C.I.A. retainer for an extended period of time.[131] What is also clear is that Roberto's autocratic and inflexible character and leadership traits had very little in common with those of his American allies. Moreover, subsequent actions provide a clear picture of an individual whose ambitions and political motives had little in common with Western democracy. In fact, the FLNA received substantial Chinese support in training and armaments in the mid 1960s, just prior to receiving C.I.A. covert support.[132]

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[130] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 1, 130-132.

[131] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, and Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A C.I.A Story (New York: W, W, Norton & company, 1978). Both works provide extensive documentation on Roberto's relationship with the C.I.A.

[132] The New York Times, January 4, 1964. Some helpful insights are also offered in Jonathan Kwintny, Endless Enemies: The Making of An Unfriendly World (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), John Pardos, President's Secret Wars(New York: Quill, 1986), and Stockwell, In Search of Enemies.

American interest in providing covert aid to UNITA in the early 1970s and again the 1980s, while consistent with its earlier support for FLNA, is even more ideologically contradictory. It should be remembered that Savimbi parted company with Roberto due to his disagreement with Roberto's autocratic rule, FNLA's tribalistic policies, and most important, Savimbi's allegations that Roberto was simply an instrument of "imperialist interests" in Angola.[133] Following the final split between the two, Savimbi's first trip in quest for assistance was to Eastern Europe and later on to China. [134] According to UNITA records, in 1965 Savimbi and 10 other members underwent a nine month military training course in China.[135] In all, Savimbi's early support and training came from China and later on from South Africa, and yet, in the mid 1980s Savimbi paradoxically became the defender of democracy in Angola. [136]

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[133]. According to The New York Times, Sep. 25, 1975, Roberto was on a $10,000 annual C.I.A retainer in 1969. For details of Savimbi's accusations against Roberto see, Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, 134-185.

[134] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, 137.

[135] Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line (London: Zed Press, 1983), 191-215.

[136] According to Marcum an unspecified shipment of arms reached FLNA in June 1975, and ninety-three tons of arms were also shipped to UNITA at the same time. Angolan Revolution, volume 2, p. 265. Also according to Kwitny, who quoted Professor Gerald Bender; "Savimbi's travels took him to most radical world revolutionaries of the time; Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser and Algeria's Ben Bella, North Vietnam's Nguyen Giap, Cuba's Che Guevara, and China's Mao Zedong." Kwitny, Endless Enemies, 136.

More importantly, Savimbi's political strategy falls clearly within the framework of Mao's theory of guerilla warfare, to whom Savimbi continued to refer as "the brilliant thinker of oppressed people."[137] In his view; "liberation of Angola would not come from outside. Only Angolans within Angola could free the country from foreign domination. And it was vital that Angolans of all tribes, clans and classes participate in the liberation struggle." He called for a socialist state that would not only accommodate an African cultural heritage but create a new liberated man. This called for an economy based on cooperative instead of exploitive systems of production and for majority rule in which Europeans might assume responsibility but not leadership.[138] It would appear that his political thinking could be traced to Mao, while his economic policies may have African communal, as well as Marxist roots. The background characteristics of UNITA's Ovimbundu leadership appear to be rural, ethnopopulist and racial, which make UNITA a polar opposite to Bakongo based FLNA.[139] Consistent with the traditional Ovimbundu leadership role, Savimbi's portrait is placed upon the altar in the church, and hymns were composed with the slogans "God in Heaven and Savimbi on Earth."[140]

By the time the Portuguese pulled out in 1974, the MPLA's political and ideological, pro-Soviet, position was very clear. It

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[137] Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, 195.

[138] Ibid., 195.

[139] Ibid., 193.

[140] Wolfer and Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line, 208.

is doubtful that a different American policy would have made any impact at this stage on an elite already committed to the Marxist cause.[141] It is equally futile to claim that either the FLNA and/or the UNITA leadership was embattled in a fight for democratic causes as understood in Western terms. Savimbi's courage and sense of survival in the context of deadly Angolan politics cannot be doubted; his ideological leaning, however, is questionable. His moral fabric and character are even more suspect.[142]

Interestingly, the Chinese broke off the relationship with Savimbi and stopped the military assistance to UNITA, claiming that he was unreliable. This may have been motivated by Savimbi's double dealings and shadowy arrangements with the Portuguese and the South Africans.[143] Following the introduction of the Clark Amendment in the United States, American covert operations in Angola stopped for

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[141] Gerald Bender argues the United States may have been able to reach some form of an accord with MPLA in 1974, when the Soviets withdrew all support one month before the Portuguese coup, and continued to withhold it for some seven months. See, "American Policy Toward Angola: A History of Linkage," in Bender, Coleman and Sklar, African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of Caliifornia press, 1985). 110-128.

[142] Research by Wolfers and Bergerol concluded that Savimbi's responses are tailored to his audience. Apparently at the UNITA mass meetings the crowd is addressed in Portuguese and Umbundu, with completely different content. Similarly, in his dealings with the Western press a significantly different message is given. See, Angola in the Front Lines, 207-209.

[143] For further discussion and documentation on Savimbi's relationship with Portuguese and South Africans see, William Minter, ed., Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 1988). See also Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Volume 2, on discussion of Savimbi's early cooperation with SWAPO in Namibia, and his subsequent betrayal of this relationship, when he forged an alliance with the South African government.

over a decade. Surprisingly, American interest in Angola reappeared on the agenda in the early 1980s, at which time Savimbi was characterized as being the only shining light of democracy in Southern Africa.

Notwithstanding that American strategic and economic interests might have been be threatened by Soviet presence in Angola as elsewhere in Africa, to credit Savimbi's UNITA with being the guiding light of democracy is certainly suspect. Even if most Americans were willing to take "containment theory" at face value, the futility of supporting ethnocentric, authoritarian movements and regimes in the name of democracy should have been apparent. The question was not so much the ousting the MPLA from political power, as much as this may have been strategically beneficial to the United States, or even morally acceptable. Installing UNITA as a replacement, probably would not have contributed to the goals of furthering the cause of democracy, given UNITA's past record.

Nicaragua

Spanish conquistadors first arrived in Nicaragua in 1522 with the mission of finding gold and converting the natives to Christianity. On the first attempt, Spaniards encountered strong Indian resistance and retreated to Panama. Two years later, a stronger force arrived in the region under the command of Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba and finally imposed the Spanish rule.[144]

[144] Walker, Nicaragua, 10.

Due to battlefield casualties against the Spanish, exposure to such European diseases as measles, smallpox and influenza (against which Indians had no natural immunity), and brutal treatment, the near extinction of the indigenous population came about within the first hundred years of Spanish colonial rule.[145] Small,isolated and often inaccessible Indian communities survived in several Latin American regions. In Nicaragua, a relatively small number of Miskito, Sumu and Zambo Indian communities survived in a tract along the Atlantic coast.[146] The initial motivations for the Spanish conquest were perhaps best summarized by one of the conquistadors, when he said; "We came here to serve God and the King, and also to get rich."[147]

The steady decrease of the indigenous population and lack of white, Spanish women led to the birth of a distinct mestizo, and later on a mulatto group, which in time became important social groups. Very often lower ranking officials, administrators, and soldiers took Indian women as their consorts. Children born of these unions became known as mestizos. The steady increase of

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[145] Walker, Nicaragua, 11. For additional discussion on colonial and precolonial Latin and Central America see, Helen Delpar, The Borzoi Reader in Latin American History Volume 1 & 2, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). Volume 1, is especially useful for understanding of earlier Indian cultures and rise of independence movements during early colonial period. Volume two, is an analysis of Mexican and Cuban revolutions and rise of Peronism as a political influence in modern Latin American countries.

[146] Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, The Central American Fact Book (New York: Grove press, Inc., 1986), 279.

[147] Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 18.

African slaves, especially along the Atlantic coast plantations, gave birth to mulattos. The Spanish aristocratic ruling elite also divided itself on the grounds of place of birth, i.e. being of Spanish birth or being of American birth. These two groups occupied different positions of power; the Spanish born elite (peninsulares) held mostly administrative positions, while the American born elite (creoles) some of whom were the direct descendants of conquistadors, became the landowning and economic elite. Later policy changes on the part of the Spanish crown widened the gap between these two groups. Thus, the Spanish born administrative elite and the American born economic elite found themselves on the opposing sides of what may be considered "economic interests".

Moreover, this growing gap between the two groups created the first wave of organized unrest against the crown. The empire's economic and political structure reflected the philosophy of mercantilism, prevalent in the economic and political thinking of Western Europe's colonial powers, where much of the natural resources of the colonies were absorbed for the benefit of the colonial power. The creole landowning elite, which lacked political power and lived under trading restrictions imposed by the crown and colonial government, increasingly expressed their discontent. This produced a first wave of anti-colonial sentiment, which in time broke into a rebellion.

The Spanish crown came face to face with two major problems simultaneously. First, was the defeat of Spanish armada by the British, which in turn was followed by a Spanish decline in Europe.

This decline ultimately meant a drastic loss of overseas colonies which were absorbed by other European powers. Second, the internal division among the white ruling Spanish colonial elite between the American born aristocracy and the Spanish born administrators, which became known as creole-peninsular conflict, undermined the colonial rule from within.[148]

However, it was events in Spain that altered the mood and political alliance of the colonial territories, specifically Napoleon's ouster of the French Bourbons from the throne and installation of his own brother as King of Spain. The creole elite rejected the new king as an imposter and declared that, "Spain no longer had a government and sovereignty went back to people."[149] A series of rebellions and uprisings spread across the whole of Spanish Latin America. With Napoleon defeated and the adoption of a liberal constitution in Spain in 1822 (which imposed certain limitations on monarchial authority, abolished the Inquisition and so threatened the role and power of the church), the conservative elements in Latin America rose in protest and sided with the liberal elements against the crown.[150] This alliance of convenience did not erode the fundamental differences between liberals and conservatives. On the contrary, in time, it intensified the rivalry between the two parties.

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[148] Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, 28.

[149] Ibid., 31.

[150] Ibid., 35.

In Nicaragua this political opposition coincided with the geographical separation and demographic division of the Spanish population. Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba established two cities shortly after his arrival in 1524; the city of Leon, situated on the northeast of Lake Managua, and Grenada, on the northern shore of Lake Nicaragua. The two cities, however, differed from each other in cultural, social, and economic characteristics. Grenada, as a political capital of the colony, became the seat of the aristocratic elite, while Leon, as a northern outpost, was occupied by Spanish soldiers and administrators of the lower rank.[151] Respectively, the Leonese eventually considered themselves to be Liberals, and Granadino aristocracy formed the Conservative party.[152]

Nicaraguan independence came in stages: first, as a part of the Mexican empire under the leadership of Agustin de Iturbide, coinciding with Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin's war of liberation against Spanish rule in 1822; second, as a member of the Central American Federation in 1823; and third, as an individual sovereign state in 1838.[153] The mixture of competing internal forces and British and North American economic (and later on political) intervention signalled a new epoch of political instability in Nicaragua. Aroused American interest in building an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua and an attempt to offset

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[151] Walker, Nicaragua, 12.

[152] Ibid., 13.

[153] Ibid., 13.

growing British influence in the region became the foundation of a Nicaraguan-American relationship. While the issues have changed, the relationship with the U.S. continues to persist to the present time as perhaps the most important factor in the political and economic life of Nicaragua.

Early American incursions (1909-1932) are perhaps best summarized by General Smedley Butler, the man who led American Marines on numerous occasions in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the region:

> I long suspected that war was a racket; not until I retired to civil life did I fully realize it. It may seem odd for me, a military man, to adopt such a comparison. Truthfulness compels me to. I spent 33 years and 4 months in active service as a member of our country's most agile military force-the Marine Corps... And during that period I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for the Wall Street and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism...Thus I helped make Mexico...safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long...I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-12...Looking back on it I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three city districts. We Marines operated on three continents.[154]

To be fair, one must admit that there was also an idealistic side to those American interventions, which were seen as bringing stability and order to the region. It was generally assumed that stability and order were the necessary preconditions for development. The "backward" Cental American and Caribbean nations,

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[154] Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1988), 2-3.

riddled with poverty and instability, presented opportunities for European intervention in what was considered to be the American backyard. Intervention and economic assistance were considered temporary measures in assisting progressive elements to acquire modern institutions and outlooks which would guarantee stable and free societies.[155] Corrupt domestic elites were often compared to American city bosses, who were often corrupt but nevertheless, turned out a solid vote, and in their own corrupt ways helped people at the bottom.[156] In the absence of constitutional checks and balances, and influenced by entrenched cultural differences (Central American political institutions owed their heritage to Spanish feudal practices and Roman law), the corrupt caudillos differed drastically in their political agendas and style from the American dream.

The marriage of convenience between the previously opposing liberal and conservative forces that defeated Spanish regulars and achieved the long scught independence is also an important determinant in Nicaraguan political life. The political cleavages between liberal and conservative forces (which can be summarized as opposing forces of European enlightenment and Spanish feudal conservatism), left an imprint on Latin American political life which is still very much a part of the political reality in Nicaragua.

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[155] Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 160.

[156] Lester D. Langley, Central America: The Real Stakes (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985), 23.

The Spanish departure enhanced opportunities for British and American interference in Nicaragua. In the nineteenth century the British tended to support the Conservatives and the Americans the Liberals. The emergence and legitimation of semi-feudal political institutions is one of the important developments during this period of conservative rule. Nicaraguan political life, very much like in the rest rest of the Central American Republics, slipped into a feudal character, resembling the personal fiefdoms of strong armed caudillos. Political support and political parties resembled the old feudal pattern of tenant vs. landlord, very much the offspring of Spanish feudal culture.

By the late 1800s, Nicaraguan political and economic life began to fall within the American orbit of influence. This asymmetrical relationship encountered a strong degree of opposition from Nicaraguans, which has proven to be as constant as the American tendency to impose its own brand of stability and order. Jose Santos Zelaya, a Liberal caudillo who came to power in 1893, was interested in limited social reforms and the re-establishment of the Central American Federation. Zelaya's foreign policy was considered anti-American and that was unacceptable. In the end his downfall in 1909 was brought about not by internal opposition, but rather by the intervention of American interests.[157]

The abysmal situation of renewed instability and unrest triggered by the Zelaya affair lasted until 1925 during which time the American Marines literally ran the country through a series of

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[157] Walker, Nicaragua, 18.

Conservative Presidents.[158] In 1926, the Liberals seized power once more and the U.S. Marines were dispatched to save the day for the Conservatives. This time, however, the Americans showed a degree of sophistication and created a series of institutions answerable to the Americans. According to one source, the Americans controlled the new regime from a number of points: "the American Embassy, the Marines, the Guardia Nacional, with its United States Army Officers, the High Commissioner of Customs, the Director of the Railway, and the National Bank."[159] Within time it would no longer make much difference whether Liberals or the Conservatives held power, the new institutions and American interests would serve as mechanisms of control.

Augusto Cesar Sandino is the source and symbol of modern day anti-American sentiment in Nicaragua. Sandino, who was opposed to American interference, emerged as a leading Liberal and revolutionary leader in the 1920s. When the Liberals agreed to the U.S. sponsored peace settlement and truce between the Liberals and the Conservatives, he chose to continue the fighting until the American forces left Nicaragua.[160] By 1932 the American government was well aware that the situation was militarily unwinnable, economically expensive and politically unpopular. With the introduction of the National Guard in 1927, the Americans were

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[158] Ibid., 20.

[159] Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America: A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 200.

[160] Walter LaFaber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States and Central America (New york: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 65.

relatively assured of a favourable continuation of the status quo. Since it no longer mattered whether the Liberals or Conservatives were in power, an open election was scheduled for January 2nd, 1932. Following the election, the U.S. Marines went home and Sandino, as he promised, came back to negotiate with the new government. Instead of the negotiating table he found a firing squad, and was killed under the order of General Anastasio Somoza, with perhaps some encouragement from U.S. Minister, Arthur Bliss Lane.[161]

Rather than closing the chapter on American problems in Nicaragua, Sandino as a martyr has proven to be an even more effective revolutionary leader than he was while alive. Contrary to the American goal of creating a non-political National Guard, the force became the single most important factor in Nicaraguan politics, and was the major key to the creation of Somoza Dynasty.[162] The rationale in Washington for a National Guard was based on the premise that the American trained Officer Corps of the newly created National Guard would be an apolitical source of stability and a foundation of economic progress.[163] Somoza, who was chosen to command the National Guard, in the line of a long history of earlier Central American rulers, established a caudillo type of government rather than, as the Americans hoped, providing the new cornerstone of democratic development.

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[161] Ibid., 68.

[162] Ibid., 66.

[163] Walker, Nicaragua, 23.

Somoza's dynasty lasted for almost half of a century. In the years following the departure of the American Marines and with Sandino dead, Somoza proceeded to consolidate his control over the National Guard, which in short period of time became his personal instrument of protection and elimination of opposition. As Walker points out, the Somoza formula was relatively simple; "maintain the support of the guard, cultivate the Americans, and co-opt important domestic power contenders."[164] Anastasio Somoza Garcia ruled Nicaragua effectively until 1956, when he was assassinated. The assassin's bullet removed Anastazio Somoza Garcia from the scene but not the Somoza dynasty from rule. His two sons, Luis and Anastasio were waiting in the wings to step in where their father left off. Both sons were educated in the United States. The elder Luis, was a graduate of Louisiana State University and University of California, while the younger, Anastasio, graduated from West Point. Appropriately, Luis was a member of Congress at time of his father's assassination and Anastasio served as head of the National Guard.[165]

In retrospect, Luis surely was the most liberal minded member of the dynasty. Even though he enjoyed democratic politics and appeared to be committed to economic development, he never relinquished the reins of power. He did, however, attempt to modernize the Liberal party and elected to step down in the subsequent election. This relaxed period of rule, which also

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[164] Ibid., 27.

[165] Ibid., 28.

coincided with relatively significant economic growth under the American policy of the Alliance of Progress, came to an abrupt end when Luis died from a heart attack in 1967. Anastasio then became the third member of the dynasty to rule Nicaragua. The youngest of the Somoza sons, Anastasio Somoza Debayle lacked his older brother's political sensitivity and his fathers shrewdness and administrative skill. At the same time he may have been the most corrupt member of the family.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle ruled in the true spirit of a nineteenth century caudillo. In accordance with the constitution, he was to step down in 1971. Rather than complying with the rule of law, however, he amended the constitution. Two additional events proved to be catalytic to his downfall. First, the resurgence of organized resistance to his rule, and second, the earthquake that destroyed a good part of Managua in 1972. To the first threat he responded with excessive force which alienated most of the rural population and the liberal portion of the religious hierarchy. Second, by his corrupt handling of the earthquake relief fund, he managed to alienate the middle class and the conservative elements of the church. The events of 1972 sowed the final seeds of the Somoza dynasty's destruction. The next several years of revolutionary struggle brought together a wide range of revolutionaries representing the middle class, the business elite, Marxist factions and religious movements.

Somoza's refusal to step down led to a strong protest from the Christian Democratic party, from the business community and from

the new Archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo. The assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal in 1978, a member of one of the oldest and most influential families in Nicaragua, proved to be the irreversible point in the Somoza decline. According to the old unwritten rule of Nicaraguan politics, it was perfectly permissible to kill, jail and torture ordinary people, but members of the old families (whether Liberal or Conservative), were above this practice.[166] This final act of barbarism brought even the most conservative elements of Nicaraguan society into the revolutionary fold. The final days of fighting and the revolutionary victory came in July 1979, at the high price of some 40,000 to 50,000 killed, and over 100,000 wounded.[167]

In retrospect, the Somoza dynasty changed little over the relatively long period of time it ruled. With the exception of some changes instituted by Luis Somoza, the rest may be viewed as retrograde and similar to the colonial pattern of political life. Political participation was of little significance and demands and rewards were granted on an individual basis, depending on the relationship with the political patriarch. The economic infrastructure also retained a feudal character, where a small landowning elite (a large number of which were Somoza family), controlled most of the arable land, while landless peasants worked as wage labourers. Industrialization created a small nucleus of

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[166] Walker, Nicaragua, 158.

[167] Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America (New York: Praeger, 1982), 162.

urban wage labourers and a growing middle class who within time came to resent the monopoly of power held by the conservative, landowning elements of the Somoza family. In the early 1970s, Nicaragua resembled a well run feudal, family business. Political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of Somoza family and trusted friends:

> Noel Pallais Debayle, his cousin headed the National Development Bank. His brother in-law, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, was the virtually permanent ambassador to the United States. Meanwhile, Ramiro Sacasa was minister of education, and uncle Manuel Debayle headed the national electric company. Samoza's wife Hope headed the social security program. Even Novedades, the Liberal newspaper which backed Somoza dynasty, was run by a cousin, Luis Pallais, while Jose Somoza remained a powerful figure in the Guardia... By 1970 the family owned more than half the agricultural production of the country and vest amounts of its industry...The total wealth of Anastasio Somoza Debayle was put at $500 million.[168]

Foreign, mostly American, industrial investments and American geopolitical ccncerns formed a natural alliance with the relatively dependable Somoza family, and the U.S. became the defender of Somoza rule over Nicaraguan society for almost a half of a century. Historically, the church hierarchy also supported the conservative, status quo elements of the society. However, changes originating with the so-called Vatican II agenda, formulated on the grounds of the Vatican's growing concern for peace and social justice, triggered the wide-spread grassroot movements of Liberation Theology in Latin America and elsewhere.[169] Although there were always dissident elements within the ranks of clergy, Liberation

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[168] Ibid., 154.

[169] Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching (New York: Orbis Books, 1983), 117-138.

Theology signified larger and deeper cleavages between the conservative and the liberal elements at every level of the church hierarchy. The intensity of this division varied from country to country depending on historical factors and the nature of the government. The situation was perhaps most serious in Central America, where even the most conservative elements of the church allied themselves with revolutionary movements, as was the case in the Nicaraguan revolutionary experience.[170] In the end, the United States stood as the only bulwark of support for a declining dynasty.

This symbiotic relationship between American interests and geopolitical concerns and the self-serving ambitions of the Somozas enhanced and widened the sentiment of anti-Americanism and served as an additional source of Nicaraguan nationalism. It is neither accidental nor surprising that young Nicaraguan revolutionaries embraced the Sandino experience as a guiding light for their revolution. The two leading and most prominent founders of Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Tomas Borge and Carlos Fonseca, flirted with Marxism in their early high-school days. Perhaps later on, at the University of Leon, they came in contact with some of Lenin's writing. The next natural step was joining the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). Whereas Marxism offered a plausible and coherent account of social conditions, it constrained

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[170] Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas: The Party and The Revolution (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 128-152.

desired revolutionary actions until historical forces produced the conditions necessary for revolution.[171]

From early childhood, Fonesca was intrigued with the Sandino story. Sandino's earlier actions of guerilla warfare and hit and run tactics were reinforced by Che Guevara's revolutionary theory, stressing the importance of the so-called "foco" strategy, which depended on an organized rural population to induce and create the necessary revolutionary conditions rather than wait for history to take its course. Discouraged with the Soviet controlled PSN, Fonesca and Borge helped to organize the FSLN in 1961.

Marxism is however, the crucial factor in understanding Sandinistas. According to Victor Tirado, one of the surviving, original members of the organization, the framework of Sandinista interpretations of events dating back to Sandino's early actions were viewed in Marxist terms:

> Marxism for the Sandinistas was a complete revelation - the discovery of a new world. And the first thing we learned from it was to know ourselves, to look inside our country into our people's heritage - toward Sandino. Through Marxism, we came to know Sandino, our history, and our roots. This is, among other things, the teaching we received from Marx - reading him, as Fonseca said, with Nicaraguan eyes.[172]

This selective approach to understanding and interpreting Sandino's writings on anti-imperialism is a weak argument in an attempt to link Sandino's actions to Marxist thought. This is most clear in Sandino's opposition to the Salvadoran Communist Augustin Farabundo

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[171] Ibid., 19.

[172] Quoted by Gilbert, from Bruce Marcus ed. Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's Revolution (New York: Pathfinder, 1985), 105.

Marti, who according to Sandino "tried to twist this movement of national defense, converting it into an essentially social struggle. I have opposed this with all my might. This movement is national and anti-imperialist."[173] Sandino's nationalism called for an organized force of workers and peasants to fight against the Americans and not against the local bourgeoisie. To the Sandinistas, who formulated their understanding of imperialism on the basis of Lenin's writings--the two were indivisible. The concept of vanguard was also most influential in Sandinista thinking, and became most evident in the first phase of the post revolutionary period when the Sandinistas made great strides to consolidate their power and carry out their economic and political agenda. In time, it became evident that the Sandinistas were attempting to impose the Leninist leadership role of party dictatorship which served to undermine the revolutionary alliance of several parties.

Prolonged struggle and alienation toward Somoza on the part of middle class and church created the favourable conditions for the formation of a coalition of ideologically diverse revolutionary movements. The Nicaraguan middle class proved to be an important addition in winning the revolution, especially in the effort to undermine American support for Somoza. The mass mobilization of grassroots movements by the Church was more significant in dealing the final blow to Somoza rule. In short, the middle class deligitimized American support for Somoza, while the grassroots

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[173] Ibid., 21.

organizations provided a vehicle for the consolidation of power by the Sandinista government.

Sandinista economic policies and vanguard approach to leadership are crucial to understanding the tensions and opposition from the middle class and the church in the post revolutionary period. Sandinista Marxist rhetoric reinforced already existing fears in the minds of Nicaraguan small business elite, who feared imposition of a Soviet-style state and economy. Based on the existing evidence, it would appear that the Sandinistas intended to use the Soviet political, but not the economic model. In the political mosaic of Nicaragua the Sandinistas rank somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. On the right were the Nicaraguan Social Christian party (PSCN), the Social Democratic party (PSD), and the Constitutional Liberal party (PLC), In the center were the Democratic Conservative party (PCD), the Popular Social Christian party (PPSC), and the Independent Liberal party (PLI), and the Sandinistas. On the left were the Nicaraguan Socialist party (PSN), the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML), and the Nicaraguan Communist party (PCN). At first, opposition to the Sandinistas came from the right and part of the left. Over time, the most serious opposition continued from the right and from the conservative elements of the church.[174]

Initial public support for the Sandinistas gained ground after October 18, 1977 when the so-called Group of Twelve, comprised of businessmen, academics, Nicaraguan priests and other professionals,

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[174] Walker, Nicaragua, 114-115.

declared that FSLN must be a part of any solution to Nicaraguan problems.[175] This support may have assisted the reunification of three FSLN factions, which quibbled and split over strategy in the early 1970s. The Prolonged Popular War (GPP), favoured a long term struggle of attrition in the countryside, the Proletarians, favoured prolonged urban struggle and the Terceristas (Third Force or Insurrectionists), did not see the need for prolonged struggle but believed in a series of armed strikes to spark popular uprising and insurrection.[176] Student groups, womens' associations, unions and traditional leftist parties joined with the FSLN to form the United Peoples Movement (PSN). This alliance also included Alfonso Robelo's Broad Opposition Front (FAO), representing businessmen and professionals.

By early February 1979, the Group of Twelve and the United Peoples Movement agreed on the terms for forming the National Patriotic Front, and were joined by the Popular Christian Party and the Independent Liberal Party. The new political platform of the NPF emphasised national sovereignty, democracy, justice and social progress, and above all, the unconditional overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship.[177] The unions and the grassroots Christian base communities served as a basis for establishing effective Civil Defense Committees (CDC), which became an additional means of control for the Sandinistas. On March 12, the Sandinistas formed

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[175] Sklar, Washington's war on Nicaragua, 11.

[176] Ibid., 14.

[177] Ibid., 23.

the nine person National Directorate, with three members from each faction. Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado of the Terceristas, Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrion and Carlos Nunez of the Proleterians and Tomas Borge, Bayardo Arce and Henry Ruis of GPP.[178]

On July 19, the day of liberation, a five member junta formed the government. As per the 1979 proposed framework for future government, executive, legislative and judicial branches were created immediately after the revolution. The real power, however, was retained by the informal Sandinista Directorate which controlled the military, the police, and a variety of volunteer grassroots organizations. In addition, the executive arm of government (the five-member Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN)), was made up of two Conservatives, one Sandinista intellectual, and two FSLN guerilla veterans. Within short time the membership changed to one Conservative and two Sandinistas. Most important, Daniel Ortega, also a member of the Sandinista Directorate, became the head of the Junta.[179] It is doubtful that Sandino, who vigorously opposed the formation of the National Guard, would have approved of such a concentration of power.

In the legislative branch, the Council was to have 33 members representing all political parties. The junta announced a proposed expansion to 47 members, which was in the end increased to 51. The

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[178] Ibid., 23.

[179] Walker, Nicaragua, 105.

Sandinistas argued that an increase in Council membership was necessary to accommodate the growing numbers of unions and grassroots organizations. In real terms this simply implied an increased Sandinista power base.[180] In protest, the more conservative members resigned from their posts and formed opposition parties, some continued to operate inside Nicaragua and some left to become the cornerstone of the newly formed and American supported counterinsurgency force (the Contras), whose initial ranks were filled by former Somoza guardsmen.

The American reaction to the Nicaraguan revolution is both consistent with its earlier practice and equally inconsistent in terms of sought after alternatives to Sandinista rule. Carter Administration policies, which alternated between addressing the Communist threat and human rights concerns, amplify the opposing character of foreign policy objectives. When it became evident that Somoza could not be saved under any circumstances, American diplomats attempted to find an acceptable alternative. Prolonged hesitation and conflicting opinions between the State Department and the National Security Council were exploited by Somoza to the bitter end. Complete withdrawal of support came at the very end, when it was no longer possible to keep the Sandinistas out of power. [181]

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[180] Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 43-46.

[181] Shirley Christian, "Defeat and Triumph," in Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. (New York: Vintage Books, 1985):116-138.

In an effort to keep the Sandinistas out of the Soviet-Cuban camp, the Carter administration started improving bilateral relations. Tensions nevertheless were rising. Historical factors worked against the relationship. As Dennis Gilbert explains:

> Each side retained deep suspicions about the other. The United States feared that Sandinistas would carry their country into the Soviet camp. The Nicaraguans feared that United States would, sooner or later, intervene against their revolution, an anxiety fed by their own national history and American cover action against revolutions in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), and Chile (1973).[182]

The Carter policy of reconciliation was abandoned by the incoming Reagan administration, whose foreign policy agenda on Central America viewed the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan problem in an East-West context. Sandinista domestic reforms and the withdrawal of the middle class and the business elite from the coalition alarmed the Reagan administration. Anti-American rhetoric on the part of the Sandinistas and open support for Soviet foreign policy objectives further played into the hands of already sceptical members of the Reagan administration.

By the end of 1981 all efforts to improve the bilateral relationship had failed. The United States no longer rejected the possibility of overthrowing the Sandinistas. Nicaragua, in part due to fears of U.S. intervention and in part due to Sandinistas' natural Marxist tendencies, drifted further into the Soviet camp in search of economic, military and political support. Although, the

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[182] Dennis Gilbert, "Nicaragua," in Morris J.Blachman, William M. Leogrande and Kenneth Sharpe, eds., Confronting Revolutions: Security through Diplomacy in Central America (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 99.

Soviets made it clear that they were unwilling to underwrite another Cuba, significant military assistance was provided. The Cubans, on the other hand, responded whole heartedly and enthusiasticly to Nicaraguan requests for assistance.

The loose coalition of anti-Sandinista opposition groups started emerging in 1980, with Robelo's and Violetta Chamorro's resignation from the junta. The Sandinistas' imposition of security measures, and curtailing of opposition parties' freedom to hold open meetings and political rallies turned political opposition into counterrevolutionary groups. Several armed Somocista movements were already in existence and located in Bolivia, Paraguay and Honduras. Most of the movements were made up of old Somoza guardsmen. The newer addition to this armed opposition camp was comprised of former revolutionary parties, who found the Sandinistas overly "communist" and unacceptable.[183]

In November 1982, President Reagan authorized formation of a C.I.A. backed paramilitary force to operate against Nicaragua from Honduras. By 1983, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), generally known as "contras" had grown to fifteen thousand strong.[184] The battlefield was defined, but the front lines remained unclear. As time went on, American objectives became less clear. What was the political goal? Was it to overthrow the Sandinistas, or simply force them to relinquish the Soviet-Cuban

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[183] Anderson, Politics in Central America, 188.

[184] Gilbert, Nicaragua, in Blachman, Leogrande and Sharpe, Confronting Revolutions, 103.

alliance? Constant division and internal quarrel among different factions of FDN undermined American efforts considerably. Most of the legitimate political parties, who disagreed vigorously with Sandinista policies, denounced the Somocista-based faction of the FDN coalition. What was the purpose of FDN? Was it to overthrow the Sandinistas, or to stop the arms flow into El Salvador? Old Somoza guardsmen formed the military infrastructure of the coalition. The more moderate members of the traditional political parties were viewed as legitimate power contenders by the Nicaraguan middle class and by the international community. The FDN, as an alternative with heavy Somocista representation, was equally unacceptable to most Nicaraguans.

The futility of American response to the Nicaraguan problem is locked in what Lester Langley describes as a situation where, "We [Americans] can't win, we can't lose, we can't quit the game."[185] It was perhaps the growing feeling that there were no American solutions to Central Americas problems that created opposition to the Reagan Central American agenda at home.

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[185] Langley, Central America, 251.

CHAPTER IV

METHODS AND FINDINGS

Methods

The method employed in this research is that of content analysis, whereby verbal observations and interpretations of a document or a newspaper article are transformed into an objective, quantitative description in order to draw certain conclusions from these observations.[186] As Holsti indicated, the key to content analysis lies in understanding the meaning of objectivity, systemization and generality.[187] This approach demands the formulation and following of a certain set of rules and procedures to achieve a degree of consistency and uniformity during the process of coding. This is achieved through establishing "intercoder reliability", where a second coder, using the same procedures, is employed on randomly selected articles to test consistency and uniformity. Intercoder reliability for this study was established at 90.1%.

The overall objective of the analysis is to explore the following questions. First, to what extent can the government introduce and shape the media agenda? Second, can the government, in addition to bringing into salience a particular issue, establish a particular explanation of events? Third, how objective are

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[186] Bernard Berlson, Contant Analysis in Communication Research (New York: The Free Press, 1952), 18.

[187] Ole Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Welsley Publishing Company, 1969), 3-5.

newspapers in their presentation of particular events to the public?

To answer these questions two newspapers were selected: The New York Times and The Washington Post. These two newspapers were selected for their extensive coverage of international events, as well as for being influential national dailies. While a number of other dailies could have been selected, The New York Times and The Washington Post rank among the top 20 dailys in the world, which are read by intellectuals, political leaders, as well as, concerned public.[188] Initially, the first six months of 1985, beginning with January 1, were selected for the investigation. Preliminary observations, however, showed substantial difference in reporting on Angola in the early part of the year from that in the latter part of the year. To capture this variance, and to investigate the reasons behind it, the first three months and the last three months were finally selected for study. All articles dealing with Angola and Nicaragua in every issue of each newspaper were coded during the study period. In total, 331 news articles were coded. The breakdown of these articles by newspaper is 197 news items from the The New York Times, and 134 items from the The Washington Post. Nicaragua received the lion's share of attention (265 items/80%) compared to 66 items/20% dealing with Angola. Eight major variables were coded: 1) dateline 2) type of content 3) source of content 4) newsmaker 5) balance in thematic content 6)

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[188] John C. Merrill, "Global Elite: A Newspaper Community of Reason," Gannett Center Journal (Fall 1990), 93-101.

headline content 7) major themes discussed in the article and 8) the key descriptors used to referr to the revolutionary governments and to counterinsurgency movements, and their respective leadership.

Findings

The first striking difference that came to light in this study is that on both conflicts The New York Times reporting of events is more complete than that found in The Washington Post: 58% of all news items were published in The New York Times, while 42% appeared in The Washington Post.

Table 4.1

Newspaper Coverage by Country

	Angola	Nicaragua	Total
	N=66 %	N=265 %	N=331 %
New York Times	54	60	58
Washington Post	46	40	42
	100	100	100

Table 4.1 indicates the distribution of the reported articles on the two countries. When broken down by country, the distribution of the reported news articles in the two newspapers is significantly uneven as well. As mentioned, 20% of the reporting in both newspapers is on Angola while 80% of the news items deal with Nicaragua. Geographical proximity of Nicaragua combined with the

intervention of the United States in Nicaraguan affairs dating back to the turn of the century, are no doubt important factors contributing to the high level of media interest in the region. The ongoing conflict between the Sandinistas and the Contras, with the U.S. involvement from the early stages of Contra inception, are perhaps additional dimensions contributing to this high degree of interest.[189] A steady flow of information generated by church groups, human rights groups and other interest groups active in the Central American region also provided a steady stream of information, as well as different view points on conflict.[190]

Angola, on the other hand, is somewhat removed from the daily awareness of the American public. As well as being outside of the so-called American "sphere of influence", Angola appears to be that portion of no man's land that, while open to the "great game" of the Cold War in that it may be nice to have, is not essential to the national security of the United States.[191] Also, church

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[189] Holly Sklar provides an excellent summary of American intervention in Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1988). The final explosion of the Reagan Administration's controversial involvement with Contras which was in the end exposed by the media is described in, Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott and Jane Hunter, The Iran Contra Connection (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987).

[190] One such example dealing with the abuse of human rights and terrorism is detailed by Reed Brody, in Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-finding Mission:September 1984-January 1985 (Boston: South End Press, 1985). Work similar in nature against Sandinistas was written by John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order (Fredrick: University Publications of America, 1987).

[191] For further details on the subject see, Richard H. Ullman, "Containment and the Shape of World Politics," in Deibel and Gaddis, Containing the Soviet Union, and John Chay and Thomas E.

groups and human rights groups were curtailed in their activity in Angola since the MPLA's consolidation of power in the late 1970s. [192] Notwithstanding these factors, the data suggest that a change of American foreign policy can bring a region into the focus of the press. This became increasingly evident with the U.S.'s renewed interest in covert operations in the mid to latter part of 1985, which propelled Angolan conflict to the forefront of the news.

The length of newspaper items was categorized as short, medium and long, where 1 to 5 paragraphs were coded as short, 6 to 15 as medium and 16 paragraphs and over as long. Overall results were as follows: 27% of the items are short, 39% medium and 34% long. When broken down by country, in the case of Angola, the length of articles was almost evenly distributed. In the case of Nicaragua, however, medium and long items account for over 75% of the news.

Over 80% of all news items can be classified as either analytical or hard core factual reporting found either on the front page or in inside page news, with the remaining portion of reporting divided between editorials, features and letters to the editor. Most of the short items lack in-depth analysis and, for the most, part provide a factual account of a single event, such as a military operation or similar highlighted incidents. It is of

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Ross, eds, Buffer States in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).

[192] For example, one study argues that for the most part MPLA purged the Church of most of the opposition in the early post colonial period, and ensured nearly complete support from the existing hierarchy. See, "The MPLA: From Movement to Party," in Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line (London: Zed Press, 1983).

interest, however, that the percentage of editorials and features is slightly higher in the case of Angola, 10% in comparison to 8.5% for Nicaragua. Judging by the tone of editorials and features it appears that members of the academic, economic and political elite were responding to a change of policy, expounding a variety of assessments, opposing views and alternatives. It is also striking that a large percentage of news articles originated in the United States, (46% of articles on Angola and 57% of articles on Nicaragua), rather than in the areas of conflict.

Table 4.2

Source of Content By Country

	Angola N=66 %	Nicaragua N=265 %	Total N=331 %
Newspaper Corespondent	73.0	83.3	80.5
UPI	4.5	3.1	4.3
AP	4.5	4.1	4.0
AFP	.5	---	.5
Reuters	7.5	1.0	4.7
Other (editorials, etc.)	10.0	8.5	6.5
	100	100	100

Data in Table 4.2 indicate that local and special corespondents dominate as sources of content. As well, local staff and special corespondents provide the majority of in-depth and analytical reporting. A total of 73% of reporting on Angola and 83% of reporting on Nicaragua originated from local staff and special corespondents (throughout this paper the two will be referred to as

local staff), with the remaining percentage of news originating either with UPI, AP, AFP or Reuters.[193]

The issue emphasis of the two newspapers is very similar. In fact, in most cases, articles deal consistently with the same issues; for the most part examining the merits of the U.S. involvement and the overall effect on the wider regional implications for United States foreign policy. For example, with respect to Angola, one source views the problems in the following way;

> The continuing war in Angola is one part of the much larger conflict over the future of southern Africa. That conflict is not primarily between East and West but between South Africa and black sub-Saharan Africa. If it ultimately affects the East-West balance adversely - which is far from certain - it will be because American policies leave the United States on the South African side at the end of conflict. Intervention in support of Jonas Savimbi could contribute importantly to just such a result.[194]

It is also significant that almost all of the news on Nicaragua originated from North American sources, while a certain portion of the news on Angola still travels by way of Europe. In general, news items on Nicaragua tend to be more in-depth and analytical in character, while the news on Angola is more factual and to the point. This is most evident with articles on military operations. UNITA's military activities are often presented as an

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[193]. This observation corresponds with findings in a study conducted by W.C. Soderlund "Reporting of Events in Central America by Canadian and American Newspapers: October-December 1983," in W.C. Soderlund and S.H. Surlin, eds, Media in Latin America and the Caribbean: Domestic and International Perspectives (Windsor: OCPLACS,1985), 165.

[194] Robert I. Johnson, "Angola Is No Place To Test U.S. Resolve," The New York Times 25 October 1985.

account of a particular operation dealing with numbers, casualties, armaments and location of the battle. Reports on Contra activities, on the other hand, most often carry overtones of political and ideological underpinnings that consistently diminish the importance of military operations. Contra actions are thus measured in terms of their political utility and legality. Moral implications in the framework of LIC operations are controversial, and are treated in a wide range of topics discussed in the news. The C.I.A. sponsored publication of the so called Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare is a case in point.

The military credibility of UNITA is often measured in terms of movement's relationship with South Africa, which is not necessarily viewed in a negative light. By some, the relationship is considered a marriage of convenience, based on political realism, not morality. It is generally assumed that UNITA enjoys overwhelming support among its own population. The Contras, on the other hand, present a moral dilemma rooted in their perceived lack of credibility among the Nicaraguan population.

As well, a greater number of sources and a wider range of newsmakers were given attention in case of Nicaragua, which may have enhanced the ideological dimension of the war. For the most part these messages were conveyed, interpreted and analyzed in a certain way to the public by local corespondents reporting the news. Therefore, it is important to ascertain what percentage of the news came from the corespondents and what percentage originated with one of the wire services. Secondly, it is important to

determine just how objective the corespondents were in delivering the news. This objectivity may be measured by way of analyzing the kind of issues discussed in the articles and the amount of coverage provided to opposing views.

Essentially, it is the corespondents' interpretation of events that is conveyed to the public, based on editors' decisions regarding what is newsworthy. [195] The gatekeeping function in the process of agenda-setting, (i.e., what news articles to reject and which articles to enter into the news stream), is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, the business at hand is an examination of the content of published articles. Table 4.2 indicates that in both case studies the majority of news stories came from newspaper-based local and foreign corespondents. This would lead one to believe that reporting (and therefore the news agenda), for the most part, would have originated in the areas of conflict, focusing attention on the indigenous socio-economic and political causes, historical circumstances and issues concerning the conflict itself. Considering the degree of correlation between longer, in-depth, analytical articles that originated with local corespondents (often absent from the news supplied by wire services), the corespondent is of immense importance as a link between the American public and distant events. In fact, we may see the corespondent as a medium of communication of analyzed and interpreted information that serves

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[195] The importance of media in shaping of public opinion as a reflection of our understanding of the outside world is eloquently addressed by Walter Lippmann's opening chapter "The World Outside and the Picture in Our Heads," in his book, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922).

as a link between the events as they happen and the way they are conveyed to us.

Table 4.3

	Dateline By Country	
	Angola	Nicaragua
	N=66	N=265
	%	%
United States	46	57
Angola	26	--
Nicaragua	--	25
Portugal	15	--
S. Africa	5	--
Honduras-Costa Rica	--	12
Other Countries	8	6
Total	100	100

Table 4.3 conveys a different message, showing that by far most reporting in the conflicts originated in the United States. The difference of 11 percent of articles originating in the United States between Angola and Nicaragua is insignificant in comparison to the overall picture. Similarly, it is interesting to note that only one quarter of the news items originated the conflict areas. Certain historical relationships are also evident from this table. Portugal is still very much important source of Angolan news, as are neighbouring Honduras and Costa Rica for Nicaragua.

These data tend to substantiate the finding emerging from similar engagements such as Vietnam, that American response at home, as well as legal, legislative and moral battles surrounding the conflict, are the most important topics of news, not actual

battlefield events themselves. It is unlikely that local corespondents assigned to Central America and Southern Africa did not file stories on a near daily basis. Yet, the articles from local corespondents in New York and Washington found their way into the news twice as often as those from the conflict sites. The remaining stories, especially the news that originated with one of the wire services, represents the agendas as viewed and interpreted in other regional and international centers such as Portugal, South Africa, El Salvador, Cuba, Spain, etc. Therefore, the impact of the views expressed by sources outside the U.S. and originating in a third country appears relatively insignificant in shaping of domestic opinions. On first impression, this presents a disturbing picture of one sided reporting, either orchestrated to support the United States government's view point or dominated by the United States concerns and leaving little room for outside interpretations of events and causes of conflict.

An examination of the newsmakers in Table 4.4, however, presents a more balanced evaluation, as it appears that a deliberate effort was made on the part of the American press to present opposing view points on most of the issues.

Table 4.4

The Newsmaker by Country

		Angola N=66 %	Nicaragua N=265 %	Total N=331 %
President	I	7.5	8.6	8.4
President	II	6.0	5.2	5.4
Administration	I	10.6	11.6	11.4
Administration	II	6.0	9.4	8.7
State Department	I	1.0	6.4	5.4
State Department	II	6.0	5.2	5.4
Department of Def.	I	---	---	---
Department of Def.	II	---	.5	.5
Congress	I	6.0	9.4	8.7
Congress	II	---	11.4	9.4
Other Gov. Dept's.	I	---	1.1	.9
Other Gov. Dept's.	II	---	.3	.3
Church Groups	I	1.5	1.1	1.2
Church Groups	II	---	2	.9
Human Rights Groups	I	---	.7	.6
Human Rights Groups	II	---	.7	.6
Economic Interest Groups	I	4.5	.8	.9
Economic Interest Groups	II	.5	---	.3
UNITA	I	25.7		5.4
UNITA	II	6.0		1.7
MPLA	I	13.6		2.7
MPLA	II	7.5		1.5
Contras	I		10.5	8.4
Contras	II		5.2	4.5
Sandinistas	I		21.1	16.9
Sandinistas	II		19.2	15.4
Cuba	I	.5	.5	1.0
Cuba	II	1.4	.9	1.2
S. Africa	I	4.5		.9
S. Africa	II	7.5		1.5
Foreign Diplomats	I		4.1	3.3
Foreign Diplomats	II	.5	1.1	1.2
Other (ie.Academic,etc.)	I	21.1	20.7	20.8
Other	II	.3	8.6	7.2

(note of explanation: (I) initial newsmaker, (II) opposing view)

In the above Table, newsmakers were ranked according to their order of mention in the article. This approach was specifically introduced to determine the extent to which the newspapers provided

space for opposing views on an item. Data show relatively clearly that the government, while able to introduce an agenda item, is unable to dictate the way in which that item is reported. The government cannot control, short of censorship, the views expressed by other newsmakers and the press appears to see tis role as seeking out opposing points of views.

A conclusion stemming from analysis of reporting over time is that a shift in the type of reporting (easy to ascertain in the case of Angola), occurred as a result of a sudden change in U.S. foreign policy. Thus, it can be concluded that President Reagan's policy, as well as his remarks and speeches, became the press agenda. The news agenda on Angola shifted considerably from the earlier part to the latter part of 1985. This shift follows the new thrust of the American foreign policy, where the discussion on revoking the Clark Amendment in the Senate (introduced in the summer of 1985), served to mark a watershed of change in American foreign policy. This step brought the United States to the centre of the Angolan conflict and introduced a new kind of interest in the region. This was almost instantly picked up by the press as a central focus of attention and this focus was maintained throughout the rest of the year.

The renewed interest in covert support for UNITA resulted in a different pattern of press interest on Angola, as data show a marked increase in reporting, as well as a change in the issues that were reported in the latter part of 1985. For example, only 26% of the sampled Angolan news articles were reported in the first

three months of 1985. An overview of the headlines clearly indicates the shift from military-economic issues which are characteristic of the early part of the year 9 U.S. economic interests and UNITA's efforts to damage the economic infrastructure by military means). The emphasis in the latter part of the year moved to issues relating to the United States sponsored covert aid program and the moral implications and political utility of supporting UNITA. The shift clearly takes place in June and July of 1985, with the U.S. Senate's vote ending the ban on the military aid to UNITA, which has been in effect since the passage of the Clark Amendment in 1975.[196] The headlines of articles in both newspapers throughout June and July focused nearly exclusively on the Senate decision and the mechanics whereby the U.S. government would deal with the decision on covert aid.[197]

While it is clear that the initiative to repeal the Clark Amendment came from the Reagan administration, the data indicate that the President's view (or the Administration's interpretation of events in the context of the Cold War), did not dominate the news. A variety of political issues, including the role of South Africa in the region and the American-South African relationship in

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[196] For example, see "U.S. Senate votes to end ban on military aid to Angolan rebels," The Washington Post (12 June 1985), and "Tally of Votes," in The New York Times (16 June 1985). In fact, most of the news on Angola during the latter part of June and throughout July deal with the U.S. decision to repel the Clark Amendment.

[197] Although news articles during this period of time were not included in the data, an overview of headlines and the main themes of reporting were conducted to reinforce this point.

the context of wider implications, in fact dominated the agenda. The political undercurrents expressed in relation to the Angolan conflict can be perhaps best be summarized in the following three articles;

> Jonas Savimbi helped liberate Angola from Portuguese colonialism in 1975. Now he's fighting to free Angola from Soviet and Cuban-backed forces that seized the Government in the vacuum left by Portugal's withdrawal. America has a duty to assist his struggle for Angolan freedom and independence.[198]

> Two weeks ago, Secretary of State George P. Shultz sent a confidential letter to Representative Robert H. Mitchel, Republican of Illinois, the House minority leader, in which he urged that the bill "be discouraged." He said that in recent weeks, both South Africa and Angola had asked the United States to help negotiate an end to the fighting in Angola[199]

> Intervention would be self-defeating. It has been our primary goal in Angola to obtain removal of Cuban and Soviet advisors. Those troops and advisors were invited originally, in the mid-1970s, as the Angola sought to defend itself against intervention by South Africa, Zaire, China and the United States....[200]

The President and the Administration, including the State Department, appeared as the initial newsmakers in just under 20% of news items. In fact, if all of the government sources, including the Congress, made the attempt to convey the same message in support of the President's agenda, the total would be just under 40% of primary newsmakers. The data suggest that opposing views regarding the conflict were given equal, and in some cases, even

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[198] Jack Camp, "Should the U.S. Aid Savimbi's Rebels in Angola?" The New York Times (03 December 1985).

[199] Bernard Gwertzman, "Aid to Angola Rebels Is Debated In Administration and Congress," The New York Times (29 October 1985).

[200] Robert I Johnson, "Angola Is No Place To Test U.S. Resolve," The New York Times (25 October 1985).

greater access. Surprisingly, there is an absence of access to non-governmental sources such as human rights groups and other interest groups, especially, in the case of Nicaragua. Given the level of involvement by the human rights groups and church groups in Nicaragua and economic interest groups in Angola, one would have expected these to have a higher profile in the press. This too, however, tends to demonstrate that continued emphasis on covert aid and political issues dominated the scene, pushing other concerns to a secondary place of importance.

The Administration's effort to present conflict in purely ideological terms encountered formidable opposition from many quarters, at home as well as abroad. As one might expect, 36% of items referred to the MPLA as a Marxist government while 36% as well stressed the ideological, East-West issues of the Soviet-Cuban influence in the region. It is, however, significant to mention that some 15.5% of the articles labelled the Sandinistas as a Communist-Marxist movement as well, even though, the Sandinistas as a ruling party consisted of Marxist and non-Marxist factions.

Not surprisingly, the revolutionary governments of Angola and Nicaragua were portrayed for the most part as non-democratic, with Marxist tendencies. What is surprising is that the counter-revolutionary movements, by and large, were not portrayed as champions of democracy in their respective regions, as these were often described by President Reagan. However, except for one article, there was no references made to UNITA's former relationship with the Soviet Union, China or North Korea. Nor were

there any references or remarks regarding Savimbi's earlier socialist tendencies. But efforts to portray UNITA as a democratic movement failed, as only some 4.5% of news items referred to UNITA in such terms. Nor did the Contras fare much better on the ideological front. Only 2.2% of the articles referred to Contras as democratic, while a slightly higher percentage (2.6%) labelled the movement as Somocista.

Table 4.5 provides an overview of the language used to describe the various participants in the two conflicts. This Table highlights the importance of certain ideological phrases employed the moral superiority/inferiority of a particular actor and consequently to generate support for a given view point. The descriptive tone utilized with respect to Angola is by far more neutral than that employed for Nicaragua. In part, this is no doubt a reflection of, as well as a response to, President Reagan's initiative to portray the Sandinistas as a component of the "evil empire", and the Contras as a democratic movement. Both the MPLA and the Sandinistas were most often labelled as "communist", while UNITA and the Contras were referred to as "freedom fighters". The information which originated with human rights groups and church groups, as well as reference to Somoza's days of tyranny associated with the National Guard, contributed to the negative image of the Contras, as they were repeatedly referred to as "somocistas" and "terrorists".[201] The Sandinistas' revolutionary rhetoric and

[201] Even though human rights groups and church groups did not rank high on the list of newsmakers during this time, the impact of their reports and publications is of high importance.

openly anti-American remarks (as expressed by some members of the Sandinista party whc were identified as Marxists), damaged the Sandinista image in the United States in the early days of the revolution. They had difficulty in overcoming this image. Ortega's campaign, in the mid-1980s, to portray the Sandinistas as a democratic force in the American news media was no doubt a deliberate attempt to influence the public opinion in the United States.

Table 4.5

Key Language Discriptors

Angola

UNITA	UNITA Leadership (Savimbi)
-South Africa backed. -anti-Communist guerillas. -terrorists. -freedom fighters. -guerillas fighting Marxist government. -pro-Western rebel movement. -anti-Marxist movement. -Savimbi's movement. -the Angolan rebel movement. -non-Communist guerillas. -African nationalist movement. -anti-Communist freedom fighters. -democratic resistance movement. -American supported resistance movement	-national hero. -top UNITA leader. -rebel leader. -morally equal to founding fathers -rebel chief
MPLA	**MPLA Leadership (desSantos)**
-Marxist Government -Marxist-Leninist movement. -pro-Soviet government. -governing party. -Angolas Marxist government. -Angola's ruling movement. -Soviet backed. -Soviet supported.	-President. -soft spoken Angolan leader. -Soviet trained petroleum engineer.

Nicaragua

Contras

-right wing rebels.
-beasts.
-pro-American guerillas.
-freedom fighters.
-true champions of freedom and democracy.
-freedom fighters-our brothers.
-terrorists.
-mercenaries.
-moral equal to the founding fathers.
-murderers.
-U.S. backed.
-U.S. supported.
-disrespectful of human rights
-reminiscent of the detested Somoza dynasty.
-anti-Communist rebels.
-anti-Sandinista rebels.
-U.S. financed coalition.
-rebel forces.
-political movement.
-Nicaraguan insurgents.
-anti-government forces.
-anti-Marxist forces.
-largest rebel group.
-counterrevolutionary forces.
-motly group of opponents.
-rebel adversaries.
-C.I.A. backed rebels.
-anti-Soviet insurgents.
-ex-Somoza henchmen.
-U.S. trained and equipped.
-ex-Somoza guardsman.
-Reagan supported.

Contras Leadership

(Cruz)
-leader of the democratic opposition.
-opposition presidential candidate.

(Calero)
-leader of the largest rebel group.
-political leader.
-businessman.
-FDN leader

(Bermudez)
-ex-National Guard officer.
-former National Guard Colonel.

(Pastora)
-charismatic.

Sandinistas	Sandinista Leadership (Ortega)
-leftist government.	-very serious, responsible
- animals.	-newly elected President.
-Marxist regime.	-unsmiling.
-not a Soviet satellite.	-president in military uniform
-seek to spread tyranny by force.	-Sandinista leader.
-Marxist-Leninist Regime.	-Leninist President.
-dictatorship.	-comandantes.
-Pseudo democracy.	
-pro-Soviet adversary.	
-self-enthroned dictatorship.	
-revolutionary government.	
-communists.	
-lovers of power.	
-creators of fortress Nicaragua.	
-totalitarian, brutal, cruel regime.	
-Militarism, corruption, fanaticism.	
-leftist rulers.	
-a menace.	
-totalitarian dungeon.	
-tyrannical regime.	
-a moral disaster.	
-pro-Moscow regime.	
-Soviet Cuban imposed dictatorship.	
-thugs.	
-national liberation front.	
-Castro Backed regime.	
-Communist minority.	
-Soviet dominated.	
-Soviet supplied.	

For the most part, the language used in Table 4.5 demonstrates the ideological dimension of LIC. Moral reasons are advanced as justification for intervention. As well, the causes of conflict are presented as an integral component of the wider East-West ideological antagonism, which is often explained in terms of good versus evil. The "good" and the "evil" are, however, interchangeable depending on the ideological orientation of the newsmaker.

Table 4.6

Headline Focus, by Content

	Angola N=66	Nicaragua N=265	Total N=331
Economic	6	3	4
Political	56	78	74
Military	27	15	18
Other (human interest, etc)	11	4	4
	100%	100%	100%

There is a delicate balance between what is a political and a military issue, especially in the context of low-intensity warfare where the two are often inseparable. Nevertheless, attempts were made to separate the two areas in Table 4.6. Issues dealing with military operations, equipment, and casualties were placed in the category of military activity. Issues dealing with covert aid, negotiations, diplomatic solutions and the American decision-making process were categorized as political. Overwhelmingly, the news is political in nature. This too is expected in low-intensity conflict. Unlike conventional warfare, where battle lines are drawn between opposing armies, LIC is characterized by the intermingling of political and the military spheres of interest and activity. It is also based on the theory that political considerations are of higher importance than the military operations. Table 4.6 also indicates that some human interest stories and economic issues found their way into the news. This was more evident in Angolan case, where the reporting in the first part of 1985 focused on

economic issues involving U.S. multinationals' involvement with the Marxist government of Angola and their overall impact on the Angolan economy. Even the political issues in this period of reporting focused on the impact of Marxism on the Angolan culture and the relationship between Soviet influence and the legacy of Portuguese colonialism.

Table 4.7

Balance in Themic Content

	Angola N=66		Nicaragua N=265
Pro-UNITA	19.1	Pro-Contra	7.9
Anti-UNITA	7.5	Anti-Contra	12.8
Pro-MPLA	.3	Pro-Sandinista	3.1
Anti-MPLA	6.0	Anti-Sandinista	27.5
Neutral	67.1	Neutral	48.7

Table 4.7 shows the balance between positive and negative evaluation and indicates that the political orientation of the participants was emphasized. In the case of Nicaragua, both the Sandinistas and the Contras are perceived in negative terms, however, the Sandinistas are painted more negatively. While UNITA is presented in a more favourable light, a degree of caution is warranted as it is also clear that the MPLA, which is clearly a Marxist regime, is seen less negatively than the Sandinistas. Therefore, additional factors may be of importance. First, the Angolan conflict involved a renewed interest, slowly emerging from the shadows of a forgotten war, where the psychological aspects of the war were still in the early stages of development. Second,

Angola was removed from the direct observation of American television cameras and newspaper reporters to which Nicaraguan conflict was exposed on a daily basis for several years. What makes this an important factor is that Sandinistas, unlike the MPLA, elected to compete with the United States government in using the American press as a psychological weapon. Historically, revolutionary governments used their own press, which simply served as an instrument of propaganda aimed at their own population and denied access to the foreign press. The fact that the Sandinistas never consolidated their power base to the point where they could impose complete press censorship may be a factor. It is also clear that Sandinista ranks were divided between Marxists and non-Marxists, providing for a more open and pluralistic society than that which they had been given credit. The geopolitical realities and the Contra bases situated in the adjacent Central American countries, as well as the immediate impact of the North American press may have forced the Sandinistas into a different form of a response. Historical experience, especially the importance of religion in Nicaragua, had proven to be unprecedented restraint on the revolutionary government and its policies.[202]

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[202] It must be noted that Sandinistas made attempts to control internal flow of information. The only opposition newspaper operating in the country at the time was the La Prensa and the only other source of independent information came from the Radio Catolica. The La Prensa, however, faced the possibility of censorship, which in fact, was imposed on several occasions. For further details see, Leonard R. Sussman's Chapter on "The Information-Power Struggle," in his book, Power, The Press and the Technology of Freedom (New York: Freedom House, 1989).

Table 4.8

Themes and Issues Discussed in the News

	Angola N=66 %	Nicaragua N=265 %	Total N=331 %
Soviet Intervention	41.9	13.0	18.9
Cuban Intervention	40.9	12.0	17.8
U.S. Intervention	25.7	19.6	20.8
S. African Intervention	19.6	----	3.0
Military Activities	34.8	15.8	19.7
Economic Issues	10.6	5.6	6.6
Individual Freedom	3.0	10.5	9.0
Communist Dictatorship	---	.5	.3
Government Oppression	.5	4.5	3.9
Trade/Investment	4.5	.7	1.5
Government Terrorism	.5	4.5	4.2
Guerilla Terrorism	12.1	12.8	12.7
Communist Subversion	.3	4.5	4.0
Diplomacy	15.1	10.1	11.2
Negotiations	16.6	17.3	17.2
Contra Group Division	---	6.7	5.4
Government Censorship	---	6.4	5.1
Covert/Military Aid	36.3	30.1	31.4
Humanitarian Aid	19.7	5.2	8.1
Freedom & Democracy	.5	7.9	6.9
Ideological Conflict	6.0	4.5	4.8
Racism	---	---	---
Church-State Relations	.5	9.0	7.4
American Moral Obligation	7.5	4.9	5.5
International Law	---	6.7	5.5
Elections	---	3.3	2.7
Fight Against Communism	3.4	10.9	11.4
U.S. Foreign Policy-S. Africa	9.0	----	1.8
U.S. Foreign Policy-Cent.Amer.	---	24.5	19.6
U.S. Decision Making Process	13.6	14.7	14.5
Cultural Issues	.3	1.5	1.5
Education	---	.3	.3
Science	---	---	---
Sports	---	.3	.3
Entertainment	---	---	---

Some 35 different themes were coded in an examination of the kind of issues that were addressed in the news, with the intent of determining just how objective the newspapers were in their coverage of the two international conflicts. The investigation

points out the limitations of journalists in determining the issues that find their way into the news. This can be attributed to a number of factors, such as gatekeepers' decisions regarding what kind of issues and stories will be of interest to the public, as well as to cultural barriers and biases imposed on journalists.[203]

As stated in the earlier chapters, the press is subjected to criticism from both sides of the ideological spectrum. Certainly enough has been written about the press being a tool of the privileged classes, as well as the other side of the coin, where the press is viewed as a critic of government policies. The media in general is gaining ground in quantum leaps as a significant factor in foreign policy-making, therefore, it is even more important to ascertain the objectivity, impartiality and fairness of the press. [204]

Table 4.8 demonstrates a degree of consistency in reporting those issues where Cold War ideological rhetoric, associated with the historical pattern of LIC, is very much evident. The question of intervention, be it by the U.S., or by the U.S.S.R., or as perceived in some circles, intervention by the superpowers'

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[203] See Wilber Shramm's chapter on "The Gatekeeper: A Memorandum," in his book, Mass Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois press, 1960), and Walter Lippmann, "Codes and Their Enemies," in Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922).

[204] On the growing influence of the news media in the foreign policy issues see, James F. Larson, "Television and U.S. Foreign Policy" in Graber, Media Power in Politics (Washington: CQ Press, 1990).

respective proxy forces or allies such as Cuba and South Africa, is certainly highlighted. U.S. intervention is discussed in both regions. Not surprisingly, U.S.S.R and Cuban intervention in Angola is far more prominent. It is, nevertheless a paradox that while the Soviet and Cuban forces were very much present in Angola to support the existing Marxist government, the ideological rhetoric of the Cold War is much less apparent in reporting on Angola, as manifested in only 6.0% of anti-MPLA sentiments in comparison to 27.5% of anti-Sandinista sentiments in Table 4.7. As well, Table 4.5 is characterized by an absence of harsh discriptive phrases used with respect to the MPLA.

CHAPTER V

Discussion and Conclusion

There appears to be a relationship between the stages of U.S. involvement in a low intensity conflict situation and the escalation of ideological rethoric. As indicated in previous studies, in most cases the U.S. government enjoys overwhelming support at home at the beginning of a crisis, and as time drags on and casualties mount, the conflict becomes less popular and less acceptable.[205] In the age of instantaneous coverage by television, follow-up news articles and what is described in "an age of documents, there are no more secrets, only deferred disclosures,"[206] the conflict is brought home to every American citizen and the process is accelerated. In the past, to maintain a desired or necessary level of support, the U.S. government has resorted to a variety of methods, including falsification of reports (experienced in Vietnam), and censorship when deemed necessary; Guatemala in 1954 providing one example. Modern technology and the medias' perceived right to be at the front lines

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[205] For example see, Cotton, "War and American Democracy," Conflict Resolution.

[206] Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Ratlines: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets (London: Heinemann, 1991), 275.

makes it more difficult for the government to impose censorship or reinforce a suitable viewpoint.[207]

An aggressive approach on the part of government to shaping the news and attempting to interpret events with a particular ideological flavour is historically more evident with Communist states, which openly utilize the press as an instrument of propaganda. The intensification of the ideological dimension of conflict on part of the Reagan Government may be in part an explanation for the difference in negative portrayals seen with respect to the Sandinistas and the MPLA. It must be reiterated that American covert support for UNITA was reemerging as an American policy option during the study period. The emotional components so prevalent in ideological explanations of causes and roots of conflict were thus emerging at a slow pace in 1985. In Angola, the setting and framework of moral grounds for U.S. support is clearly the Soviet and Cuban presence, more than the existence of the MPLA or the merits of portraying UNITA as a democratic force. The Soviet-Cuban presence was clear, however, and the ramifications of this presence had to be outlined in broader terms of economic, political and military stakes in the region.

In Nicaragua the factors of Soviet-Cuban presence was framed in terms of the Sandinistas' political aspirations beyond their own

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[207] These points are highlighted in the Leonard R. Sussman's book, Power, The Press and The Technology of Freedom: The Coming Age of ISDEN (New York: Freedom House, 1989); and Walter B. Wriston, "Technology and Sovereignty," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988/89): 63-75.

borders.[208] In terms of actual economic and military assistance, the Sandinistas enjoyed modest support from Cuba and even less from the Soviet Union during this period of time. Political support, however, especially, from Cuba was considerable. Moral support alone is of little value and often may be counterproductive; in this case it served to corroborate the already negative image of the Sandinistas in the United States. The Nicaraguan Revolution was over five years old at the point of the study. Hence, the intensification of ideological justification for U.S. intervention also corresponds to the stage of involvement, with charges of communist dictatorship, a fight against communism, and the U.S. moral obligation to support the democratic forces in the region being much more evident in Nicaragua than in Angola. The main thrust of attack was directed against the Sandinistas, who were perceived as an agent of Soviet and Cuban encroachment in a region deemed essential to the national security of the United States.

Data in Table 4.8 support the hypothesis that the press is still able to give voice to opposing views, thus giving a wider picture than that presented by the United States government. It is relatively clear that government views did not dominate the debate. Although the Contras were described by the President and the Administration as a democratic force and Savimbi was compared to

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[208] The U.S. Governments position in respect to Sandinista aspirations and possible consequences for Central American region are clearly outlined by John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America: The Sandinista Assault on World Order (Fredrick: University Publications of America, Inc., 1987).

the "Founding Fathers," the overall image of the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary forces in both conflicts was negative. Evidence for this conclusion is also seen in Table 4.9. Opposition to the government position came from a variety of sources, including the Congress. This said, there was no disagreement regarding the merits of disposing of the Sandinistas or the MPLA. The evidence suggests that for the most part there is a consensus of elite opinion concerning the negative character of the Sandinistas and, to a lesser degree, the MPLA. The issue of contention in most cases centred on the instruments to be employed in resolving the conflict and disposing of the revolutionary governments, or at minimum, to exert enough pressure to alter the existing revolutionary policies, and above all, to limit Soviet-Cuban influence in the two regions. Differences, for the most part, rest on the utility of various instruments of persuasion available to the United States; hence diplomacy and negotiations received as much attention as the subject of covert aid and military operations.

As mentioned earlier, ideological conflict associated with the Cold War rests on moral issues which leave little or no room for the grey areas so prevalent in the international political arena. The U.S. government, however, is often forced to form alliances with movements and governments that simply cannot be "sold" to the American public on moral grounds. Unfortunately these political realities also diminish the utility of ideological rhetoric. For example, domestic opposition to U.S. involvement is raised due to

South African involvement in Angola, and the negative image of Contras is attributed to their connection with Somoza's National Guard. A significant portion of neutral reporting outside of government circles which de-emphasizes the ideological component in the conflict, points to a more serious real politik approach, emphasising the importance of diplomacy, negotiations and, in the case of Nicaragua, international law. This too points to the new kind of tools of conflict resolution that have become central to the Cold War and the LIC experience. [209]

Starting from the Greek Civil War in the late 1940s, through the decolonialization process (whether by means of revolution or peaceful transition), the period of the Cold War has seen governments increasingly employ a combination of foreign policy instruments, ranging from diplomacy and negotiations, to economic sanctions and force of arms. Herein lies one of the major differences between conventional military operations and LIC operations. Conventional war demands the destruction of military forces before political change can take place. LIC operations demand an introduction of political change while the military operations are in progress.[210] Unlike the situation in conventional operations, goals are often unclear and obscured in LIC settings. For example, it never became clear whether the Reagan

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[209] F. S. Northedge and M. D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 1971).

[210] See Edward E. Rice, "Recurrence and Radicalization in Wars of the Third Kind," in his book, Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

Administration sought the actual overthrow of the Sandinistas or was willing to settle for some sort of democratic reform. Similarly, in Angola it was never clarified whether the true aim was to overthrow the MPLA and install UNITA, or to force MPLA to introduce political reforms and call for the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban troops from the region.

An important difference between the two case studies lies in the relative accessibility to the American public enjoyed by the two revolutionary governments faced with insurgencies. The importance of the Sandinistas being able to respond to President Reagan's charges by way of feature articles and press releases in the American dailies is immense. If nothing else it adds credibility to the Sandinista cause. Secondly, it introduces an element of doubt in the minds of the American public with respect to their own government's policy. Most importantly, it undermines the effort of the U.S. government to gain prolonged public support for military and covert operations that are clearly outside the normally accepted framework of conflict.

This is not a question of truth or lies, journalistic biases, or even the government's ability to portray the war in a certain light. The important point is the enemy's ability to bring the "battlefield" into focus for the American public in ways which it choses. In this sense it would seem that the North Vietnamese government was much more in tune with the importance of culture and historical experiences than were American politicians during the crucial years of the Vietnam War. It may be that the Vietnamese

were more familiar with Almond's work, "The American People and Foreign Policy than were decision-makers at home. Afterall, Cuba and Castro learned their lessons from the failure of Arbenz in Guatemala, and certain lessons of history seem to have worked for the Sandinistas as well. For example, Edward E. Rice highlights the position and the role of the press in the Guatemalan crisis with the following remarks;

> ...This misinformation was believed, in part, because the international press corps-barred from the "war zone" accepted what It was being told by the American Embassy and by the press office of the United Fruit Company...[211]

Once again this dimension of emotional involvement is absent from Angola. The significance of the inaccessibility of events to the American press cannot be underestimated. The fact that almost 70% of the news came from local corespondents must be tempered by the corespondent's inability to report from the front lines, which for the most part was the case. News reports were often handed down either by UNITA or MPLA representatives, or an account of events was articulated by someone else who was present at the scene of battle. For the most part the reporting was staged and controlled by Savimbi or by the MPLA. This absence of details from daily headlines eliminates the closeness or the personal emotional involvement on part of the press, decision-makers and ultimately the public as a whole. The less visible the opposition is, the easier it is to create the mythical hero image for foreign consumption, such as was the case with Savimbi. This may have

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[211] Rice, Wars of the Third Kind. 44

escaped journalists in general, but it is no doubt an important factor in Savimbi's campaign to present a new image to the Western media. Savimbi and UNITA, by far, dominated the agenda on Angola in both newspapers throughout 1985, appearing as a newsmaker in 26% of press items. In addition, one should consider Savimbi's publicity campaign in the United States in January 1986, costing in excess of $600,000 and featuring the article that appeared in the May 1987 issue of Reader's Digest with the headline "Can This Man Save Africa?" It must be mentioned that this is the same Reader's Digest that accused the FNLA in the earlier stages of the colonial struggle of being Communist, while Savimbi was Roberto's right hand man. It is especially interesting to note that no remarks or analysis are to be found in any reporting during this period of time in reference to Savimbi's Maoist tendencies, so prevalent at the time of the inception of UNITA, when he charged against the FNLA of being a tool of Western-American interests in the region. Even UNITA's connections to the South African Government are often downplayed in his interviews, even though that country has been one of the most important sources of continued support to UNITA over the past fifteen years.

Turning to Nicaragua, conversely, the Contras appear to have lacked the kind of political sophistication necessary to overcome a negative perception in the United States media. The Contras were simply unable to overcome the stigma of being linked to Somoza's National Guard. Unlike the UNITA, the Contras did not enjoy a high degree of access to the press. Moreover, there was a lack of

cohesion among the different factions of the movement, centred on the issue of National Guardsmens' role in the movement. Some 6.7% of the news articles deal with this issue. In comparison, in the case of Angola, there was only one article dealing with the issue of internal division among the UNITA's leadership, which was based on question of military tactics and not on the grounds of political or ideological division.[212] The deep rooted political division among the Contra leadership is often presented as a formidable obstacle to unity in the organization, as well as explaining the Contras inability to engage in a concerted effort to seek support from the United States. For example, the best known rebel leader, Eden Pastora Gomez, refused to come under the umbrella of the so-called Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (NDF) or the Contras on the grounds that the NDF "included too many followers of Nicaragua's former dictator Somoza Debayle."[213]

Pastora also commanded a formidable military force of some several thousand men, which would have no doubt enhanced the outcome of military operations on the part of the Contras. The political division, therefore, translates into military ineffectiveness of the movement. Once again this seems to be absent in the case of UNITA, as indicated in reporting on Angola, where some 35% of news items deal with military activity, while in reporting on Nicaragua this figure is 16%. This creates two sets of

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212. "Disagreement About Strategy Surfaces Among Angolan Rebels" The Washington Post (22 February 1985).

213. Joel Brinkley, "Leaders of Anti-Sandinistas Form Alliance Urged by U.S." The New York Times (01 March 1985).

problems. First, it diminishes the credibility of the insurgency movement, which translates into a decline of support on part of the American public. Consequently, the degree of support on the part of the American public in the long run dictates the degree of involvement that the U.S. government is able to sustain over a prolonged period of time. Second, it allows the Sandinistas to exploit the political division, as noted in the Indian leader Brooklyn Riviera's announcement that he was willing to negotiate with the Sandinistas independently from rest of the rebel groups.[214]

Human rights, individual freedoms and terrorism most certainly shape images about governments as well as insurgency movements attempting to overthrow them. This could even be taken one step further, where the images of certain kinds of activities may influence our opinions and emotional feelings about the organizations involved. The data show relatively similar levels of reporting on guerilla terrorism between the two countries, slightly over 12%. Based on that figure, one would expect the same level of negative reporting on both UNITA and the Contras. Yet, the data in Table 4.8, indicating balance in thematic content, show a significantly higher degree of negative opinion toward the Contras than toward UNITA. The tone of reporting and the kind of issues addressed in the news may have some impact on the perceptions and opinions formed by the journalists and thus on the elite and

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[214]. Lucia Annunziata, " A New Contra Problem Starts" The New York Times (02 January 1985).

ultimately the public in general. As already mentioned, Contra association with ex-Somoza Guardsman was a formidable obstacle to the U.S. Government's portrayal of the movement as a democratic force. The following is a typical article dealing with the abuse of human rights by the Contras;

> The Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the largest of the United States-backed rebel groups seeking the overthrow of the Managua government, called today for additional investigations into allegations that its members had committed abuses against unarmed civilians in Nicaragua... including rape, kidnapping, torture, mutilation and murder of numerous unarmed civilians...[215]

In comparison, this type of reporting is for the most part absent from the news articles on UNITA, even when the issue of human rights abuses is raised. The only references to such abuses found in the news dealt with taking of hostage foreigners employed by the multinationals working in Angola, or destruction and disruption of government services. [216]

Individual freedoms, government censorship and religious freedoms, as a reflection of the government policies, are highlighted to a greater extent in Nicaragua than in Angola. In part, this may be a reflection of the absence of human rights and

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[215]. Joel Brinkly, "Nicaraguan Rebels Seeking Inquiry Into Abuse Charges," The New York Times (08 March 1985). Also of interest is the following article "A former top official of the Salvadorian government charged today that a man who was a senior officer in the largest United States backed Nicaraguan rebel group 'played a key role' in organizing and training El Salvadorian death squads" as reported by Joel Brinkly, in "Nicaraguan Ex-Rebel Accused Of Role In Salvadorean Death Squads," The New York Times (22 March 1985).

[216]. For example see, Peter Wise, "Angolan Rebels Hold Americans," The Washington Post (1 January 1985).

religious groups from Angola. Nevertheless, the kind of images conveyed to the public are bound to produce a certain kind of reaction. The fact that censorship of media was imposed during this period of time seems to have some direct response from the Western journalists in Nicaragua. Journalists were restricted in movement as well as in reporting in Angola, and yet this issue is given more favourable treatment in Angola than Nicaragua. For example, the contrast between the two is perhaps best noted in the following two articles of The New York Times;

> When the Soviet Union celebrated its 50th anniversary of Socialist Realism last year, its most orthodox ally in Africa was marching to a different drummer on the subject of writers and writing. With relative freedom to write and Government help to publish, writers in Marxist Angola have emerged to form a major current in African literature.[217]

The question that is buried underneath the surface of this shallow approach and never analyzed is how free is free? How does the Marxist Government respond to criticism on human rights issues, on the mismanagement of resources, economic downslide, corruption and inefficiency of bureaucracy and declining living conditions? The major issues revolve around the heroism of revolutionary struggle against the colonial masters. Socio-economic issues still reflect the colonial era.

In contrast, in Nicaragua, The New York Times conveys a different kind of analysis of the situation;

> La Prensa, the acerbic and partisan daily newspaper that has irritated every Nicaraguan Government over the last half-century, was to have carried six articles on its front page on

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[217] James Brooke, "Angolan Writers Bloom in Independent Climate," The New York Times (3 January 1985).

> Monday. Only one, an account of injuries during an exhibition bullfight in Managua, survived the censor's pencil. The other, all covering aspects of Nicaragua's domestic or international situation, were banned.[218]

The differences in the two messages are self-evident, leading one to assume that Angola is a far more democratic and open society in comparison to Nicaragua.[219] The impact of a news article on decision-makers and the public at large is subject to many other factors. A consistent image portrayed over a prolonged period of time, however, may contribute greatly to the formation of our perceptions. For example, one study points out that, for the most part, individuals are quite sensitive to international affairs, and depend upon the references furnished by the media. Certain kinds of attitudes and opinions do not develop instantly but rather over a prolonged period of time, often based on the information received from the media.[220]

What is most evident in the news reporting is a kind of narrow focused approach to interpretation of events without reference to human conditions and historical starting points that lay deeper at the roots of the ongoing conflicts. An almost complete absence of discussion of such topics as cultural issues, science, education, sports, entertainment, etc. attest to this omission. People do not exist in a social vacuum where nothing else outside of war is

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[218] Stephen Kinzer, "In Nicaragua, Rights Curbs Bring Uncertainty and More Censorship," The New York Times (24 Oct 1985).

[219] Brooke, "Angolan Writers Bloom in Independent Climate" The New York Times

[220] R. Shapiro, and G. Dempsey, "What Moves Public Opinion?" in Graber, Media Power in Politics, 108.

taking place in their daily lives. The media, however, tends to convey this distorted reality. This is far from the truth, especially, in situations of low-intensity conflict where the actual military operations account for a fraction of human activity in a given society.

Even economic issues, when commented upon, refer to conflict and the Cold War. In Nicaragua, for the most part, investment, trade, economic policies and access to goods and services are left out of press reporting. In Angola, on the other hand, as already indicated, the tone of reporting changed during the year. This perhaps warrants additional explanation. Typical headlines of news articles from the early part of 1985 read; "Angola's Brazilian Connection: Surging Trade", "In Angola, Oil and Politics Mix". These headlines are largely absent from reporting in the latter part of 1985, and replaced by; "Should the U.S. Aid Savimbi's Rebels in Angola?", "Reagan to Press Ahead With Plan to Provide Aid to Angolan Rebels", "Angolan Rebels Expect Government Offensive", etc.

In conclusion, the data generated for this study indicate that the U.S. government is clearly able to set and maintain the press agenda for a prolonged period of time. The government's point of view, however, is far from the only interpretation of events, circumstances and causes of conflict. There is also some indication that the closer the media are to the front lines, the more difficult it is for the government to impose its views. Questions of fair reporting, covering diverse issues and in-depth analytical

explanations of historical factors, have been bones of contention between Third World countries and the Western media for some time. Factors ranging from questionable ethics on the part of journalists, to corporate ownership of the media often concerned with profit are no doubt important ingredients in dictating the kind of news that is presented in the press. Nevertheless, the American press appears to exercise a strong degree of independence from its government. That this freedom is guided (often impeded) by what may be considered cultural ignorance, or restrained by beliefs and values of journalists, editors and owners of the media is acknowledged. As real as these constraints may be, however, they are not the cause of the U.S. government's failure in implementation of it's policies, including LIC Doctrine.

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